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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Discounting of Delayed and Probabilistic Rewards by Women with and without Binge 
Eating Disorder 
by 
Jamie Lee Manwaring 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
Washington University in St. Louis, 2009 
Professor Denise Wilfley, Chair 
 
Obese individuals with binge eating disorder (BED) exhibit more general and 
eating-disordered psychopathology than obese individuals without BED.  Binge eating 
also impedes weight-loss efforts, already difficult in an obese population.  A better basic 
understanding of binge eating and obesity is needed to refine treatments for both 
conditions.  Discounting, an experimental paradigm that examines changes in the value 
of delayed or uncertain outcomes, may provide an objective assessment of impulsive 
behavior.  Impulsivity may perpetuate binge eating, but discounting tasks have never 
been evaluated with eating disordered individuals.  A discounting procedure could help 
differentiate individuals with eating/weight problems from controls in terms of impulsive 
behavior and the relative value of rewards.  This study compared discounting rates of 
food, money, sedentary activity, and a control variable among 30 obese women with 
BED, 30 obese women without BED, and 30 normal-weight controls.  Relations were 
examined between questionnaire measures of psychopathology and discounting rates; 
and between obesity and binge eating and discounting rates.  The BED group 
discounted delayed and probabilistic rewards overall more steeply (impulsively) than 
Obese and Controls, with no difference between the latter two groups.  Further, the BED 
group discounted delayed food more steeply than money as compared to Obese and 
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Controls.  Delay and probability discounting rates were correlated with general 
psychopathology but not eating disorder psychopathology, obesity, binge eating, or self-
report impulsivity questionnaires.  These results indicate that women with BED choose 
rewards more impulsively, especially with food, and are more risk averse, than obese or 
normal-weight women, and obese and normal-weight women do not differ in their 
impulsive decision-making.  General psychopathology, but not scores on impulsivity 
questionnaires, was correlated with discounting rates, portending further research into 
the relationship between impulsive decision-making and other psychological disorders, 
and providing further support of the multidimensionality of impulsivity.  The more 
impulsive decision-making by the BED group suggests a temperamental difference in 
this eating disorder that cannot be accounted for by the concomitant obesity.  Future 
research should examine the predictive power of discounting within individuals with BED 
and its amenability with psychological treatment, which also would aid in developing 
prevention and treatment programs for other impulse-control disorders. 
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INTRODUCTION 
       Introductory Concepts 
 Binge eating -- eating an unambiguously large amount of food accompanied by a 
sense of loss of control -- is a hallmark of the eating disorders bulimia nervosa and binge 
eating disorder (BED; American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  In addition to the 
numerous health consequences associated with obesity (National Task Force on the 
Prevention and Treatment of Obesity, 2000b), obese individuals with BED compose a 
distinct subset of this population, with a large number of studies consistently 
demonstrating robust differences between the clinical profiles of obese individuals with, 
and obese individuals without, BED (Marcus, 1993; Yanovski, Gormally, Lesser, 
Gwirtsman, & Yanovski, 1994).  In comparison to non-BED obese, obese individuals 
with BED have more chaotic eating habits, consume larger amounts of food between 
binge episodes, exhibit higher levels of eating disinhibition (i.e., eating in response to 
emotional states), suffer from significantly higher levels of eating disorder 
psychopathology, and have higher rates of psychiatric comorbidity (e.g., Wilfley, 
Schwartz, Spurrell, & Fairburn, 2000; Wilson, Nonas, & Rosenblum, 1993; Yanovski et 
al., 1992).  The presence of binge eating, distressing in and of itself, also impedes 
weight-loss efforts, already difficult and important in an obese population (McGuire, 
Wing, Klem, Lang, & Hill, 1999; Orzano & Scott, 2004).  Cognitive behavioral therapy 
and interpersonal psychotherapy have demonstrated effectiveness in their treatment of 
BED (Wilfley et al., 2002); even so, approximately one-third of these patients relapse 
after treatment ends (Grilo, Masheb, & Wilson, 2005; Safer, Lively, Telch, & Agras, 
2002).  Clearly, there is a need to understand better the nature of binge eating and 
obesity in order to both develop and refine treatments for both disorders.  One way to 
move clinical science forward is by incorporating research from different but 
complementary fields to augment our knowledge base. 
10 
 
 Binge eating is an example of the common practice of engaging in a short-term 
behavior that is counter to one’s overall long-term best interest (Petry, 2003).  Impulsivity 
and self-control have been implicated in the maintenance of binge eating (e.g., Claes, 
Vandereycken, & Vertommen, 2005), and one of the main defining features of binge 
eating is a feeling of “losing control” over eating, but few studies have examined the 
more basic relationship between binge eaters and their choice of food.  It is not known 
whether individuals with eating or weight problems ascribe greater value to food and/or 
sedentary activity than individuals without these problems, and fully understanding this 
relationship has been further limited by participants’ difficulty in adhering to long-term 
diet and exercise programs (Epstein, 1992; Prentice et al., 2006).  Using basic research 
to determine the components that influence behavior (a ‘bottom up’ approach) is just as 
essential to understanding binge eating and obesity as applied studies that use the 
knowledge obtained from more basic research (‘top down’; Epstein, 1998; Staddon & 
Bueno, 1991).   
 Behavioral choice theory, or behavioral economics, is one learning approach with 
clinical implications to the understanding of decision making, which studies how time and 
responses are allotted depending upon the options presented to the individual (Epstein, 
1998; Rachlin, 1989; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998).  One of the main principles of this 
approach is that choice depends on the span of time occurring between choosing and 
receiving the alternatives.  When two reinforcers are available immediately, individuals 
typically will opt for the larger reinforcer; however, if the larger reinforcer is delayed, 
individuals now have a more difficult choice and may choose impulsively by selecting the 
smaller, but more immediate, reinforcer (Green & Myerson, 2004; Rachlin, 1989).  In 
other words, the larger reinforcer has been discounted because of its delay. Delay 
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discounting1 refers to the decrease in the subjective value of a reward as the time until 
its receipt increases (e.g., most people would prefer $40 today than $40 in a week), 
whereas probability discounting refers to the decrease in the subjective value of a 
reward as the likelihood of its receipt decreases (e.g., most prefer a 90% certainty of $40 
over a 10% certainty of $60).  The discounting model has been proposed as an 
underlying mechanism for behavioral problems such as substance abuse (Rachlin, 
1990) and other addictions (Ainslie & Haendel, 1983; Petry, 2001a; Raineri & Rachlin, 
1993), and offers a significant advancement to current psychological theories of 
impulsivity and self-control (e.g., Ainslie, 1992; Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Green & 
Myerson, 1993; Logue, 1988).    
 Despite the purported role of impulsivity (and its counterpart, self-control) in 
binge eating and obesity, a discounting paradigm has never been used to investigate the 
behavior of this population (Wogar, Bradshaw, & Szabadi, 1992).  The use of a 
discounting procedure could help differentiate obese from non-obese, and binge eaters 
from non-binge eaters in terms of impulsive behavior and/or self-control by asking these 
individuals to choose between valued rewards such as food and money that are 
available at different delays or with different probabilities.  
 Impulsivity has been defined as the choice of a smaller, more immediate reward 
over a larger, more delayed reward, with self-control as the opposite (Rachlin & Green, 
1972).  This definition has been extended by also including small immediate rewards 
that have delayed negative consequences, such as having dessert now and having bad 
health later (Rachlin, 1974).  Given this definition of impulsivity, the discounting task may 
provide an objective assessment of impulsivity.  For example, when a smoker decides to 
refuse a single cigarette, s/he is choosing an uncertain but larger reward (future good 
health) over a more-probable but smaller reward (pleasure of smoking; Rachlin, 2000).  
                                                 
1
 See Appendix A for a glossary of terms used throughout this work. 
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For substances or activities considered to be addictive such as drugs, alcohol, and 
gambling, the harmful effect of present consumption on future well-being is particularly 
strong (Green & Kagel, 1996).  
 Food is often thought of as ‘addictive’; indeed, consuming abused substances 
and food appears to activate the same “pleasure” centers in the brain (e.g., Simansky, 
2005), but whereas the addiction process may be similar in food and drug cravings 
(Cassin & Von Ranson, 2007), the neural sensitization in dopamine-related systems that 
are caused by drugs, but not by food, amplifies drug addiction to a state unlikely to be 
matched by most food rewards (Berridge, 1996; Di Chiara, 2005; Robinson & Berridge, 
1993).  Nonetheless, food is very reinforcing both physiologically (e.g., stimulates taste 
buds, dopamine receptors) and psychologically (e.g., through learned associations of 
smell and taste), which provides just one of the reasons for the disparate rise in obesity 
coupled with the desire for thinness (Epstein et al., 2004; Hedley et al., 2004).  Food-
related behavior is also an activity that can be easily reconciled with the concepts of 
impulsivity and self-control, as measured by a discounting task.  For example, over a 
decade, most people would agree that they prefer to be healthy than to be a couch 
potato and/or glutton; however, most people would rather, right now, sit on the couch 
than go to the gym, and eat the slice of cake rather than abstain (Rachlin, 2000).  This 
conundrum, based on whether one is choosing to heed the short- or long-term outcome, 
forms the basis of using delay and probability discounting to measure impulsivity and 
self-control.  
 The introduction will discuss behavioral choice theory, discounting, impulsivity, 
and self-control; how these concepts pertain to the clinical population of binge eaters 
and obese individuals; and the aims and hypotheses of the current proposal.  
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Behavioral Choice Theory 
 Research on learning, cognitive psychology and decision-making, and 
economics have all contributed to behavioral choice theory, which has proposed several 
general principles of choice behavior (Epstein, 1998; Frederick, Loewenstein, & 
O'Donoghue, 2002; Herrnstein, 1974; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).  Many factors 
influence choice behavior; impulsive behavior and self-control are two salient 
psychological concepts that have been studied for their role in choice behavior.  As 
stated above, one of these principles, and the basis for this study, is that the delay 
before receiving a reinforcer influences the choice behavior.  The application of this 
principle to diet and physical activity is apparent to most people making a choice 
between the immediate pleasurable benefits of ‘junk food’ and sedentary activity, and 
the delayed benefits of healthy food and physical activity.  Another principle of 
behavioral choice theory states that the choice of an alternative depends on its 
behavioral cost (Bickel, DeGrandpre, Higgins, & Hughes, 1990); thus, the proposal that 
low-nutrient-dense snack foods should be taxed in an effort to curb the rise of obesity 
(Wang & Brownell, 2005).  A third principle is that the choice and reinforcing value of a 
reward depend partially on the alternatives available to the individual; hence, the 
success of contingency-management procedures that reward abstinent drug users with 
monetary incentives (Bickel, Amass, Higgins, Badger, & Esch, 1997; Epstein, 1998), and 
the treatment strategy for overeaters of ‘finding alternatives to binge eating’ (Fairburn, 
1995).  It also can be seen how this principle lends itself well to testing by the 
discounting paradigm, which asks the participant to choose among various alternatives.  
 Finally, behavioral choice theory states that voluntary choice is an important 
motivator to obtain a reinforcer.  Again, this principle is apparent in, for example, 
recommendations that weight-loss interventions provide choices among healthy 
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alternatives (Nicklas & Johnson, 2004), instead of the individual being forced into a 
recommended diet regimen.  
 A choice always involves both a rational decision about which reinforcer is more 
valuable, as well as individual differences in one’s ability to wait for the larger, delayed 
reinforcer (i.e., exhibiting self-control; Rachlin, 1989).  It is this latter concept in which the 
current work is interested.  
Discounting 
Introduction 
 In 1937 the economist and later Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson proposed the 
discounted utility model, and although he had reservations about its descriptive validity, 
this simple and elegant model was quickly embraced as the framework with which to 
examine choice decisions (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Samuelson, 
1937).  This economic approach, which derives a formula from theoretical assumptions 
about what organisms ought to do, is represented by an exponential equation. 
Psychologists and behavioral economists, for their part, have favored a hyperbolic 
equation to better describe how organisms actually behave, instead of normative 
behavior proscribed by the discounted utility model (Ainslie, 1992; Green & Myerson, 
1993; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003; Myerson & Green, 1995).  The 
hyperbolic delay discounting function is: 
V = A/(1+kD)s                                                       (1) 
where V represents the subjective value of a future reward of amount A, the parameter k 
governs the rate of discounting, D is the delay until receipt of the reward, and the 
exponent s may reflect the nonlinear scaling of amount and/or time (Ainslie, 1992; 
Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Myerson & Green, 1995).  Figure 1 shows the change in 
subjective value of monetary rewards as a function of delay to the reward (data are from 
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Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 25, p. 423).  The symbols represent the group median subjective 
value of a $200 (circles) and a $5,000 (squares) delayed reward, plotted as a proportion 
of the amount of the delayed reward. The curves represent the best-fitting hyperboloid 
(Equation 1) fit to the obtained data.   
 
Figure 1.  
Subjective value as a function of delay until receiving a 
reward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A mathematically equivalent form (i.e., a hyperboloid) for probability is:  
                                                               V = A/(1+hθ)s                                                 (2) 
where V represents the subjective value of a probabilistic reward of amount A, 
parameter h reflects the rate of decrease in subjective value, θ represents the odds 
against receipt of a probabilistic reward (where θ = (1 - p)/p, where p is the probability 
of receipt), and the exponent s may reflect the nonlinear scaling of amount and/or odds 
against (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998). 
Figure 2 shows the change in subjective value of probabilistic $200 and $5,000 rewards 
(expressed as a proportion of their nominal amounts) plotted as a function of the odds 
against their receipt.  The curved lines represent the hyperbola-like discounting function 
(Equation 2) fit to the obtained data.  Data are from Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 
1999, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, & Cognition, 25, p. 423. 
16 
 
Figure 2. 
Subjective value of probabilistic rewards as a 
function of the odds against their receipt.  
 
 
Changes in the value of delayed or uncertain outcomes may be viewed from the 
perspective of the discounting framework (Green & Myerson, 2004).  If an individual 
finds it difficult to sustain the choices s/he made for a reward (e.g., waiting to get 
intoxicated), this individual should discount the value of that reinforcer (e.g., alcohol) 
more steeply as a function of delay than reinforcers for which s/he does not find as 
difficult to sustain choice.  For example, it might be anticipated that a heroin addict will 
have a more difficult time delaying gratification for heroin than for other reinforcers, such 
as money.  Such individuals should discount the value of heroin more rapidly when its 
receipt is delayed than other ‘less intense’ reinforcers not involving addiction (Reynolds 
& Schiffbauer, 2005).   
 According to the discounting model, there should also be a relation between 
impulsiveness and addiction.  The positive effects associated with, for example, 
excessive food intake, such as pleasant tastes and satiation, occur within seconds or 
minutes of intake; conversely, the more negative effects of excessive food intake usually  
are delayed in time as health consequences and weight increase occur gradually; the 
delayed negative effects are thus discounted.  The steeper the rate of discounting, the 
less those negative delayed effects should weigh in current decisions regarding whether 
or not to overeat, or in another example, to abuse drugs.  Therefore, steeper discount 
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rates (larger values of k) should be associated with deleterious behaviors and addiction 
(Kirby & Petry, 2004).     
 The similarity between the mathematical functions of delay (time until receipt) 
and probabilistic (likelihood of receipt) discounting has led to speculation that these two 
forms of discounting may be accounted for by similar underlying processes (Green & 
Myerson, 1996; Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Rachlin, 
Siegel, & Cross, 1994; Stevenson, 1986).  However, although the same mathematical 
formula accurately describes the discounting of both delayed and probabilistic rewards, 
significant differences between the two types of discounting are apparent, and most 
researchers treat delay and probability discounting as separate phenomena 
(Kalenscher, 2006).  First, the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards is 
affected by amount of reward in opposite ways.  That is, as the amount of a delayed 
reward increases, the rate of discounting decreases; conversely, as the amount of a 
probabilistic reward increases, the rate of discounting increases (Du, Green, & Myerson, 
2002; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 
2003; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991).  Second, the rate that probabilistic rewards are 
discounted appears to increase continuously with amount, whereas the rate of 
discounting delayed rewards has been found to level off at approximately $25,000 
(Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999).  Third, 
inflation has been found to affect the rate of discounting involving delayed rewards, but 
not probabilistic rewards (Ostaszewski, Green, & Myerson, 1998).  Fourth, the scaling 
parameter of the discounting function (s) is unaffected by amount of delayed reward, but 
increases as the amount of the probabilistic reward increases (Myerson, Green, Hanson, 
Holt, & Estle, 2003).  
 Finally, if delay and probability discounting reflect the same underlying trait, such 
as impulsivity or risk-taking, then the discounting rates between them should be 
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negatively correlated within the same individual. This is because steep delay discounting 
would reflect an inability to wait for delayed rewards, whereas shallow probability 
discounting would reflect a tendency toward risk-taking, because the subjective value of 
probabilistic rewards would decrease relatively little as risk increased (e.g., Green & 
Myerson, 2004; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003).  However, this negative 
correlation has not been found (Alessi & Petry, 2003; Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003; 
Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003; Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 
2006; Olson, Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 2007).  Another study found that delay 
discounting differed among participants with different personality temperaments as 
measured by questionnaire, but that probability discounting did not differ among these 
same participants (Ostaszewski, 1997).  Thus, it appears that evidence is currently 
against a unitary underlying mechanism for delay and probability discounting, although 
the decision-making processes involved in each is likely similar (Green, Myerson, & 
Ostaszewski, 1999).  
Anomalies 
 Even as Samuelson proposed the discounted utility model in 1937, he cautioned 
that its descriptive validity may not hold for all individual behavior (Samuelson, 1937); 
indeed, individuals demonstrate several inconsistencies that violate the theory of rational 
behavior that would be predicted if the discounting function was the only determinant 
used in maximizing behavioral utility (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002).  
Decision makers do not use a single discount rate for all decisions, but rather adjust their 
rates according to a number of factors (Chapman, 1998; George Loewenstein & Thaler, 
1989).  First, as noted previously, discount rates are not constant over time as predicted 
by an exponential function, but decline hyperbolically (Chapman, 1996; Kirby, 1997).  
Discount rates tend to be steeper for shorter delays than for longer delays, and when a 
discount rate is steep, a person is unlikely to use future rewards to guide current choices 
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(Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Kirby & Guastello, 2001; Thaler, 1981).  Second, in what is 
known as the magnitude effect (see Figure 3), discount rates depend not only on the 
time delay, but also on the amount of the outcome.  Larger delayed amounts of rewards 
(e.g., $10,000) are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed amounts (e.g., $100; 
Kirby, 1997).  This effect has been shown with individuals discounting both real and 
hypothetical money (Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 
1994; Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Holcomb & 
Nelson, 1992; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Kirby, 
Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Myerson & Green, 1995; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; Shelley, 1993; 
Thaler, 1981), hypothetical health outcomes (Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Elstein, 
1995), as well as medical treatments, vacations, and use of a rental car (Baker, 
Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Raineri & Rachlin, 1993; Schoenfelder & Hantula, 2003).  The 
magnitude effect has been shown to be opposite with probabilistic rewards; that is, 
smaller probabilistic rewards are discounted less steeply than larger probabilistic 
rewards (Christensen, Parker, Silberberg, & Hursh, 1998; Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; 
Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999; Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003).   
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Figure 3. Illustration of the magnitude effect. Rate of discounting (b) of delayed and probabilistic 
rewards as function of amount. From Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 25(2). 418-427. 
 
Third, although individuals often choose the smaller, more immediate reward 
over a larger, delayed reward, this preference reverses if delays to both rewards are 
increased equally.  Preference reversals have been shown for humans and animals in 
both delay discounting tasks (Ainslie & Herrnstein, 1981; Green & Estle, 2003; Kirby & 
Herrnstein, 1995; Mazur, 1987; Rachlin & Green, 1972; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988), and 
in probability discounting tasks (Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, & Cross, 1987).  These studies 
indicate that the same individual may be ‘impulsive’ at short delays, but demonstrate 
more ‘self-control’ at long delays (Green & Myerson, 1993).  For example, an individual 
may prefer $20 today instead of $30 in two weeks, but if the delays to both rewards are 
lengthened equally by two weeks ($20 in two weeks and $30 in a month), this individual 
then may likely choose the larger amount. Preference reversals may be represented as 
shown in Figure 4 (e.g., Ainslie, 1975).  The vertical axis represents the subjective, or 
discounted, value of a future reward, and the horizontal axis represents time.  In this 
representation, the further to the left, the further in time from the rewards, and moving to 
the right (from T1 to T2) represents moving closer in time to the rewards.  The heights of 
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the bars represent the actual reward amounts.  The curves show how their subjective 
values might change as a function of the time at which the rewards are evaluated.  Such 
curves are termed discounting functions because they indicate how the value of a future 
reward is devalued with its delay.  According to the representation in Figure 4, if one 
were offered the choice between the smaller-sooner (SS) and the larger-later (LL) 
rewards at time 1 (T1), one would chose LL, whereas if one were offered a choice 
between the same rewards at time 2 (T2), one would chose SS.   
Figure 4. 
Preference Reversal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Fourth, decisions in discounting tasks are often framed as a choice between two 
gains or two losses; in what is known as the sign effect, gains are discounted at a 
steeper rate than are losses (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Benzion, Rapoport, & 
Yagil, 1989; Chapman, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein, 1988; 
MacKeigan, Larson, Draugalis, Bootman, & Burns, 1993; Thaler, 1981).  For example, 
individuals have been found to delay discount hypothetical money gains at a steeper 
rate than hypothetical money losses (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; G. 
Loewenstein, 1988).  This effect also has been found when discounting health outcomes 
(Chapman, 1996; MacKeigan, Larson, Draugalis, Bootman, & Burns, 1993) and when 
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discounting tasks are presented to substance abusers (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003).  
In research examining the combination of the magnitude effect and the sign effect, Estle 
et al. (2006) found that at smaller amounts, delayed gains are discounted more steeply 
than delayed losses, but at larger amounts, probabilistic gains are discounted 
significantly more steeply than probabilistic losses.  This suggests that positive and 
negative outcomes are not discounted via a unitary process (Estle, Green, Myerson, & 
Holt, 2006). 
Correlates 
 Group differences in delay discounting rates have been found across the 
lifespan: children demonstrate the steepest discount rates (Olson, Hooper, Collins, & 
Luciana, 2007), with adults and older adults progressively less steep (Green, Fry, & 
Myerson, 1994).  Both children and adults discount future rewards according to the 
same hyperboloid functions; it is the degree to which they discount that varies with age 
(Green & Myerson, 1993).  Income also has been examined as a possible influence on 
discounting rate.  Lower-income older adults were found to discount delayed rewards 
more steeply than upper-income older adults or younger adults.  Further, no discounting 
differences existed between the upper income groups (Green, Myerson, Lichtman, 
Rosen, & Fry, 1996).  In examining personality constructs and discounting, high or low 
levels of sensation-seeking, extroversion, and impulsivity were compared.  Extraverted 
and highly impulsive individuals showed steeper discounting of delayed rewards 
(Ostaszewski, 1996; 1997) whereas high sensation-seeking and impulsive individuals 
showed steeper discounting of delayed losses (Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2005). Comparing 
the same groups on a probabilistic discounting task revealed that high sensation seekers 
showed less-steep discounting for more probabilistic rewards (less risk averse; 
Ostaszewski, 1997), whereas highly impulsive individuals showed less-steep discounting 
(more risk averse) for probabilistic losses (Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2005; Richards, 
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Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999).  Finally, cultural differences also have been assessed 
in discounting.  Du et al. (2002) found that American and Chinese graduate students 
discounted delayed rewards more steeply than Japanese graduate students; however, 
the mathematical form of the functions across groups were similar.  Thus, discounting 
tasks have been demonstrated as sensitive indicators of factors such as personality, 
age, and income.   
 Some research has examined biological correlates of discounting.  In fMRI 
research, one study found that delay discounting differences were positively correlated 
with the magnitude of ventral striatum activation in response to both positive and 
negative feedback (Hariri et al., 2006).  The ventral striatum has a role in mediating 
behavioral responses related to reward, and its dysregulation contributes to addiction 
(Kalivas & Volkow, 2005).  Other fMRI studies have found convincing evidence that 
choices involving immediate rewards (Tanaka et al., 2004), and choices between a 
smaller, sooner reward and a larger, delayed reward (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & 
Cohen, 2004; Monterosso et al., 2007), activate the limbic and paralimbic cortical reward 
systems.  In contrast, in participants who chose the larger, later reward, brain areas 
involved in executive control (the lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices) were activated 
(McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004; Tanaka et al., 2004; Wittmann, Leland, 
& Paulus, 2007), providing evidence of differential neural activation depending on 
whether short- or long-term rewards are predicted (Tanaka et al., 2004).  Delay 
discounting also has been found to be related to intelligence in adolescents (Olson, 
Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 2007) and adults (de Wit, Flory, Acheson, McCloskey, & 
Manuck, 2007).  Individuals with ADHD have been found to discount rewards more 
steeply than controls (e.g., Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & Metevia, 2001); this 
phenomena was further validated in a study that found d-amphetamine – an effective 
treatment for ADHD (Spencer et al., 2001) – decreased impulsive responding on a delay 
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discounting measure (de Wit, Enggasser, & Richards, 2002).  In contrast to these 
findings, one study found that diazepam – an anxiolytic that has had effects on impulsive 
behavior in rats (Evenden & Ryan, 1996) but not humans  (Reynolds, Richards, 
Dassinger, & de Wit, 2004) – had no effect on measures of delay or probability 
discounting (Acheson, Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  Further, the opioid receptor 
antagonist naltrexone, one of the few approved treatments for alcoholism, did not 
reliably reduce impulsive choice (as measured by delay discounting) in abstinent 
alcoholics (Mitchell, Tavares, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2007).   
Constructs 
 Before the literature on the discounting paradigm as applied to clinical 
populations can be reviewed, it is vital to reach a better understanding of the underlying 
constructs discounting is thought to assess.  Delay of gratification, impulsivity, and self-
control are all constructs that have been used to explain the results of discounting tasks.  
Delay of gratification originated from developmental and personality psychology as 
compared to delay discounting, which emerged from behavioral analysis.  However, 
these delay of gratification and delay discounting tasks are largely treated as measuring 
equivalent constructs (e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; 
Logue, 1988; Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 2005).  The delay-of-gratification paradigm 
usually involves a scenario in which rewards (often food) are placed in plain view of the 
participant who can choose their less-preferred reward at any time, or wait a longer 
amount of time to earn their more preferred reward.  In these paradigms, most studies 
have found that obese children tolerate less delay for food items than non-obese 
children (Bonato & Boland, 1983; Johnson, Parry, & Drabman, 1978; Lewittes & Israel, 
1978; Sigal & Adler, 1976; Sobhany & Rogers, 1985); one study did not find this 
difference, although there were still differences in the individuals’ eating patterns (Geller, 
Keane, & Scheirer, 1981).  Another study found no difference between overweight and 
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normal-weight girls in their ability to delay gratification, but did find that the overweight 
girls utilized less-effective self-control strategies during the delay period, a finding that 
may have implications for one’s long-term ability to delay gratification (Bourget & White, 
1984).  
 Impulsivity, and its theoretical counterpart self-control, are the constructs most 
likely cited when discussing the discounting paradigm.  The effect of impulsive traits (as 
measured by questionnaires) on delay and probabilistic discounting has been found 
consistently, suggesting that impulsivity is closely related to the discounting process 
(Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2005).  As previously mentioned, impulsivity has been defined 
as the choice of a smaller, more immediate reward over a larger, more delayed reward, 
with self-control as the opposite (Rachlin & Green, 1972).  Given this definition, it is not 
surprising that discounting is often conceptualized as the underlying mechanism of 
behavioral impulsivity and self-control (Logue, 1995; Ostaszewski & Karzel, 2005).  The 
advantage of using this definition is its quantitative nature and ease of translation into a 
laboratory discounting study.  It also provides a synopsis of often-complex choice 
behavior and can be applied to many behaviors found in nature, including food selection 
and clinical problems (Logue, 1988).  Disadvantages include the possibility that the 
discounting of more immediate and concrete rewards such as money may not be related 
to more delayed and abstract rewards such as good health (Rachlin, 2000).  
Impulsivity and self-control are concepts quite relevant to a society that views 
extreme impulsivity/lack of self-control as negative qualities. The colloquial definition of 
self-control perceives self-control as an inner quality; thus, the Western view of a trim 
body as evidence of this virtue, and the consequent denigration of obesity, even by 
obese individuals (Brownell, 1991; Wang, Brownell, & Wadden, 2004).  Conversely, the 
behavioral definition removes the moral connotation of the word that perceives self-
control as an inner quality, and instead views self-control as a direct result of how 
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sensitive one’s behavior is to the effect of delay and amount (Green & Myerson, 1993; 
Logue, Rodriguez, Peña-Correal, & Mauro, 1984).  Humans have evolved in accordance 
with the principle that the longer an event is delayed, the less likely the event will occur.  
Delayed reinforcers are therefore “discounted” in value because of the lower probability 
of receiving the reinforcer. Indeed, two recent studies found that uncertainty ratings were 
moderately correlated (r = .55 and .37, respectively) with the delay discounting task, 
implying that delayed rewards can equal “uncertain” in people’s minds (Patak & 
Reynolds, 2007; Reynolds, Patak, & Shroff, 2007).  Thus, waiting for food can be risky in 
evolutionary terms; unreliable food resources and energy expended in obtaining food 
suggests that the optimal choice may be to seek out immediate rewards and eat when 
food is available (Logue, 2004).  In sum, “The future is uncertain; eat dessert first” 
(Fantino, 1995).  Although impulsivity has been advantageous in the past, the 
predictability and availability of food for most humans in today’s environment means that 
discounting delayed rewards and choosing to eat now can be maladaptive and 
potentially may lead to obesity (Ainslie, 1992; Wadden, Brownell, & Foster, 2002).  It is 
possible that our reward systems and self-control interact to produce our decisions about 
food (van den Bos & de Ridder, 2006).     
It is not therefore surprising that individuals exhibit less self-control for food 
reinforcers delivered immediately within a session than for points exchangeable for food 
at the end of a session (Forzano & Logue, 1994).  However, it is not clear whether this 
finding reflects a general property of consumable rewards, or whether it represents 
something special about the food (Odum & Rainaud, 2003).  An ‘abused’ substance, 
such as food or drugs, might be discounted more steeply than money because it is an 
immediately reinforcing reward, whereas money is a conditioned reinforcer.  In other 
words, differences in the time of delivery between rewards may help determine whether 
one acts ‘impulsively’ or with self-control (Logue, King, Chavarro, & Volpe, 1990).  
27 
 
Conversely, it may be that ‘abused’ substances, that is, substances with the potential to 
be used in excess of what is beneficial in the long-term, may be discounted more steeply 
because the individual truly values this substance more than money, or because there is 
something special about the abused substance.  
The ‘problem’ of self-control and choice behavior is that individuals can only act 
in the present (Mischel, 1984; Rachlin, 2000).  Viewing two alternatives at a distance, 
one can be objective in evaluating their relative value; however, when the smaller reward 
is “virtually dangled in front of our noses,” desire for it is elevated and, unless 
contingencies are in place, it is easy to make the impulsive choice (Rachlin, 2000).  With 
simple ambivalence and two clearly defined alternatives, self-control is often easier; for 
example, the choice between one candy now versus two candies in an hour.  Complex 
ambivalence involves a smaller, more immediate and distinct reward versus a larger, 
abstract reward; for example, abstaining from the ice-cream sundae now for better 
health later.  Better health in the future is certainly preferred to one sundae now, but the 
sundae is often chosen because ‘better health’ is distant in time, abstract, not clearly 
definable or measurable, and not even certain (Logue, 1995).  The serious self-
control/impulsive problems of everyday life usually arise as complex ambivalence 
(Rachlin, 2000). 
Substance Abuse 
 People frequently engage in short-term behaviors counter to their overall best 
interest (Rachlin, 2000).  Theoretically, delay discounting can be used to analyze almost 
any behavior that involves delayed consequences that aggregate over time (Critchfield & 
Kollins, 2001).  Behavioral problems such as substance abuse, gambling, and 
overeating, which involve a discrepancy between global long-term outcomes and 
specific short-term choices, can be examined within a discounting paradigm.  Applying 
this paradigm to issues of clinical relevance, however, is still in its nascent stages.  One 
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study found that individuals with schizophrenia discount more steeply than controls 
(Heerey, Robinson, McMahon, & Gold, 2007), another study examined discounting 
among individuals with high and low social anxiety (Rounds, Beck, & Grant, 2007), and 
several studies have found that individuals with ADHD discount delayed monetary 
rewards more steeply than controls (Barkley, Edwards, Laneri, Fletcher, & Metevia, 
2001; Schweitzer & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1995; Solanto, Abikoff, & Sonuga-Barke, 2001; 
Sonuga-Barke, Taylor, Sembi, & Smith, 1992; Sonuga-Barke, Williams, Hall, & Saxton, 
1996; Winstanley, Eagle, & Robbins, 2006), but the vast majority of studies examining 
discounting tasks within a clinical population have focused on substance abusers 
(Reynolds, 2006b).     
 Participants who abuse alcohol, nicotine, cocaine, methamphetamines, and 
opioids have consistently been found to discount delayed rewards more steeply than 
controls (with crack users discounting more steeply than heroin users; Bornovalova, 
Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005), and to discount their abused 
substance more steeply than money (Ainslie & Haendel, 1983; Baker, Johnson, & 
Bickel, 2003; Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Bjork, Hommer, Grant, & Danube, 2004; 
Bretteville-Jensen, 1999; Chesson & Viscusi, 2000; Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 
2003; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001; Field, Rush, Cole, & Goudie, 2007; Giordano et al., 
2002; Heil, Johnson, Higgins, & Bickel, 2006; Hoffman et al., 2006; Kirby & Petry, 2004; 
Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Madden, Bickel, & Jacobs, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, & 
Bickel, 1997; Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Mitchell, 1999; Odum, 
Madden, Badger, & Bickel, 2000; Odum, Madden, & Bickel, 2002; Odum & Rainaud, 
2003; Petry, 2001a, 2002, 2003; Reynolds, 2006a; Reynolds, Karraker, Horn, & 
Richards, 2003; Reynolds et al., 2007; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998; Yi, Chase, & Bickel, 
2007).  One study found that sober undergraduates actually discounted delayed rewards 
at a steeper rate than intoxicated undergraduates (Ortner, MacDonald, & Olmstead, 
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2003), but a recent study using a more sensitive measure of discounting did find that 
alcohol at two different levels promoted steeper discounting compared to placebo 
(Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006). 
 Further, notable differences have been found among subgroups of substance 
abusers with comorbidity that support discounting’s face validity, divergent validity, and 
sensitivity to measure comorbidity.  For example, substance abusers with gambling 
problems show steeper discount rates than substance abusers without gambling 
problems (Petry & Casarella, 1999); gamblers with substance abuse comorbidity show 
steeper discount rates than gamblers without substance abuse comorbidity (Petry, 
2001b); and substance abusers with antisocial personality disorder show steeper 
discount rates than substance abusers without antisocial personality disorder (Petry, 
2002). However, one study found that alcoholics with cluster B personality disorder did 
not differ on delay discounting from alcoholics without cluster B personality disorder 
(Dom, De Wilde, Hulstijn, Van Den Brink, & Sabbe, 2006).  Notwithstanding the few 
divergent findings, individuals who abuse more alcohol ( Field, Christiansen, Cole, & 
Goudie, 2007; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), more nicotine (Heyman & Gibb, 2006; 
Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 2005), or become alcoholic earlier in life (Dom, 
D'haene, Hulstijn, & Sabbe, 2006) show steeper discount rates than less-frequent 
abusers, or later-onset abusers (although one study found no difference between light 
and heavy smokers; Johnson, Bickel, & Baker, 2007).  Studies of probability discounting 
between smokers and nonsmokers have had mixed results, likely because an effect is 
only seen when heavy smokers are compared against nonsmokers (Yi, Chase, & Bickel, 
2007).  The discounting tasks have been applicable to assessing substance abusers, but 
they also have been applicable to other behavioral problems such as gambling (Alessi & 
Petry, 2003; Dixon, Jacobs, & Sanders, 2006; Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003; Holt, 
Green, & Myerson, 2003; MacKillop, Anderson, Castelda, Mattson, & Donovick, 2006). 
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 Discounting rates also may be malleable, as studies have found that current 
substance abusers show steeper discount rates than abstinent former substance 
abusers, who, in turn, show steeper discount rates than never-substance-abusers 
(Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Bickel, Odum, & Madden, 1999; Bretteville-Jensen, 
1999; Kirby & Petry, 2004; Odum, Madden, & Bickel, 2002; Petry, 2001a).  A study of 
college students without substance abuse disorders found that the degree of discounting 
and the age of first alcohol use, smoking, marijuana use, and total number of substances 
used were significantly correlated (Kollins, 2003).  These results demonstrate ecological 
validity of discounting as a measure of impulsivity, noting a clear differentiation that 
exists between substance abusers and lower-level or abstinent abusers.  
 Recently, investigators have examined the effect of drug deprivation on 
discounting rates, with mixed results.  One study found that nicotine deprivation led to 
steeper discounting for both cigarette and monetary rewards (Field, Santarcangelo, 
Sumnall, Goudie, & Cole, 2006), while another study found that nicotine deprivation led 
to steeper discounting for cigarette, but not monetary rewards (Mitchell, 2004), and a 
study on cocaine deprivation found no difference between abstinent and current users 
(Heil, Johnson, Higgins, & Bickel, 2006).  
 Questionnaire-measured impulsivity has been found to predict substance abuse 
(Dawes, Tarter, & Kirisci, 1997) and gambling (Vitaro, Arseneault, & Tremblay, 1999), 
and reliable negative correlations have been found between discount rates and college 
grade-point averages (Kirby, Winston, & Sentiesteban, 2005).  Only recently, however, 
have studies on the predictive validity of discounting been conducted.  One study 
examined delay discounting rates among adolescents who had completed a smoking 
cessation program – abstinent adolescents discounted less steeply on a real-time 
discounting task, but not on a questionnaire measure of discounting (Krishnan-Sarin et 
al., 2007).  This was consistent with a study that found individuals who smoked after a 3-
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hour deprivation period showed steeper discounting than individuals who continued to 
abstain (Dallery & Raiff, 2007).  Another study examined delay discounting at baseline 
among pregnant smokers who had spontaneously quit, and found that delay discounting 
significantly predicted relapse to smoking status at 24 weeks postpartum, with steeper 
discounting indicating less likelihood of postpartum abstinence (Yoon et al., 2007).  
Further, delay discounting had been assessed periodically throughout their partum and 
postpartum periods and did not significantly change over time regardless of smoking 
relapse status, a stability also found in an examination of abstinent inpatient alcoholics 
(Takahashi, Furukawa, Miyakawa, Maesato, & Higuchi, 2007).  
 A few studies have examined clinical implications of discounting and substance 
abuse.  One study found that, surprisingly, smoking cues (e.g., holding a cigarette) had 
no effect on delay discounting in smokers (Field, Rush, Cole, & Goudie, 2007); another 
recent study may explicate these reasons.  Audrain-McGovern and colleagues followed 
a cohort of adolescents for four years.  They found that delay discounting was 
significantly correlated with baseline smoking rates, but only indirectly influenced the 
odds of smoking progression via its impact on complementary reinforcers (i.e., 
accompanying activities that reinforce smoking such as alcohol use and peer smoking).  
The authors suggest that delay discounting may indirectly influence smoking 
development, but directly affect smoking behavior once the habit is established (Audrain-
McGovern et al., 2004).  These results suggest either a premorbid difference in 
impulsivity and ability to delay gratification that leads to substance abuse, a direct effect 
of the drug that affects discounting rates, or improved self-control once the behavior 
improves (Kirby & Petry, 2004).  Further longitudinal studies are needed to assess the 
direction of causality between discounting rates and impulsive behavior.  In sum, the 
literature suggests that substance abusers discount money more steeply than controls, 
discount their abused substance more steeply than money, produce steeper discount 
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rates if they have a comorbid diagnosis, generate steeper discount rates if they are a 
current user instead of an abstinent user, and have discount rates that are predictive of 
their nicotine abstinence status.  
 Although substance abusers discount their abused substance more steeply than 
money, it is not clear whether this indicates a unique feature about the abused 
substance or the substance abuser, or whether it might represent a general property of 
immediately consumable rewards (Odum & Rainaud, 2003).  In support of the latter 
possibility, nonalcoholics were shown to discount alcohol more steeply than money 
(Petry, 2001a), and non-alcoholics were found to discount alcohol and food equally but 
more steeply than money (Odum & Rainaud, 2003).  Recently, Estle et al. (2007) 
recruited non-substance-abusing college students to study delay and probabilistic 
discounting in comparing an abused substance (alcohol) with non-abused but 
immediately consumable substances (beer, soda, and candy).  They found that, for both 
smaller and larger amounts, participants discounted delayed monetary rewards less 
steeply than directly consumable rewards (beer, candy, soda), which were discounted at 
equivalent rates.  These results support the idea that money may be discounted less 
steeply than consumable rewards because money retains its value and is exchangeable 
for other goods, whereas consumable rewards such as alcohol or food are most 
valuable at the moment of discounting (Catania, 1998; Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 
2006).  Estle and colleagues also found, however, that among probabilistic rewards, 
there was no difference between the discounting of monetary and directly consumable 
rewards.  Thus far, no study has examined the discounting of abused substances 
compared to other immediately consumable rewards in a clinical population.  
Health Domains 
 Discounting of health decisions has not been examined as thoroughly as the 
discounting of monetary amounts, but the findings to date demonstrate that decisions 
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regarding both health and money show delay, magnitude, and sign effects, with the 
effect of the latter two factors appearing more pronounced for health than for money 
(Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Rose & Weeks, 1988).  Another outcome 
from these studies has been the consistency with which domain independence was 
demonstrated (Cairns, 1992; Chapman, 1996; Chapman & Elstein, 1995; Chapman, 
Nelson, & Hier, 1999; Fuchs, 1982; Petry, 2003).  Domain independence is the finding 
that individuals produce reliable discount rates within a domain, but low correlations 
between domains, such as that between health and money.  Domain independence is 
contrary to discounted utility theory, which states that the same delay discount rate 
should be applied to all outcomes if goods are indeed exchangeable (Chapman, 1996; 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992).  Instead, individuals tend to have different discount rates 
for different domains.  For example, vacation time and health were discounted more 
similarly, and more steeply, than money (Chapman & Elstein, 1995), and this was not 
accounted for by participant familiarity with the domains, nor in dissimilarities between 
descriptions of the domains (Chapman, Nelson, & Hier, 1999).  Domain independence is 
posited to result from the immediacy with which one must enjoy health or a vacation 
(primary reinforcers), whereas money can be borrowed, invested, and exchanged for 
rewards (conditioned reinforcer; Chapman, Nelson, & Hier, 1999).  
Rationale for Clinical Use 
 The discounting model of impulsivity and self-control predicts that discounting 
rates would be correlated with impulsive behavior in the real world (Ainslie, 1975; 
Rachlin, 2000).  Indeed, group differences in the discounting tasks noted between 
substance abusers and controls (e.g., Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997), levels of 
substance abuse (e.g., Petry, 2001a), high- and low-risk psychiatric outpatients (Crean, 
de Wit, & Richards, 2000), borderline personality disorder and controls (Dougherty, 
Bjorka, Huckabee, Moellera, & Swanna, 1999), extraverts and introverts (Ostaszewski, 
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1997), and age cohorts (Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994) offers a degree of face validity 
that performance on the discounting tasks measures at least one dimension of 
impulsivity, or a mechanism or trait highly correlated with impulsive behavior (Kirby, 
Petry, & Bickel, 1999).  It is possible, then, that individual differences in discounting may 
play a factor in determining to which group (e.g., substance abusers or not) an individual 
will belong (Green & Myerson, 2004), with special populations distinguished in terms of 
discounting (Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  Discounting provides a precise, quantitative 
approach for studying behavior in the lab (Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000) that has 
been found to be relatively stable over time (Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000; Takahashi, 
Furukawa, Miyakawa, Maesato, & Higuchi, 2007).  
 Behavioral problems including aggression, gambling, depression, overeating, 
and failure to exercise have all been postulated to involve some amount of impulsivity 
(Bickel & Marsch, 2001).  Even though a subset of binge eaters has demonstrated 
stronger correlations with impulsivity measures than with dietary restraint (Steiger, 
Lehoux, & Gauvin, 1999), and 25% of one sample of successful weight losers cited 
future health concerns as motivation to lose weight (Tinker & Tucker, 1997), discounting 
tasks have never been utilized in a sample of overweight or eating-disordered 
individuals.  Examining behavioral characteristics with discounting tasks is a more 
construct-relevant indicator of impulsivity than questionnaires (Petry, 2001b), which, by 
their very nature, are not a direct measure of behavior (Epstein, 1992).  Discounting 
tasks also enable examination of the behavioral process in a way that allows 
experimental analysis (Bickel & Marsch, 2001). Using discounting measures in this 
population may foster a better understanding of the nuances in maladaptive impulsive 
behavior such as binge eating.  Ultimately, these findings may lead to distinguishing 
subtypes, predicting future behavior, and informing individual interventions (Critchfield & 
Kollins, 2001). 
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Impulsivity 
Multidimensional Definition 
 Both personality and behavioral researchers tend to use the term ‘impulsive’ as if 
it was a unitary construct, but it now is well recognized that the only consensus 
regarding impulsivity is its multidimensional nature (Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000; 
Evenden, 1999; Helmers, Young, & Pihl, 1995; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de 
Wit, 2006; White et al., 1994).  Disagreement continues as to the number and type of 
impulsivity dimensions, which ranges from two (Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 
1985) to fifteen (Gerbing, Ahadi, & Patton, 1987), and has included such various 
concepts in the personality literature as an inability to wait, insensitivity to 
consequences, tendency to act without forethought, novelty-seeking, and an inability to 
inhibit inappropriate behaviors (Ainslie, 1975; Barkley, 1997; Barratt & Patton, 1983; 
Cloninger, 1987; Eysenck, 1993; Rachlin & Green, 1972).  The behavioral definition, as 
discussed earlier, states that impulsivity is the choice of a smaller, more immediate 
reward over a larger, more delayed reward (Ainslie, 1975; Logue, 1988; Rachlin, 1995); 
both personality and behavioral definitions associate impulsivity with a preference for 
more immediate gratification (Mitchell, 1999). 
 Additional support for the multidimensionality nature of impulsivity appears in the 
numerous factor-analytic studies that have produced several possible components of 
impulsivity.  For example, Barratt derived the factors motor impulsiveness, nonplanning 
impulsiveness, and attentional impulsiveness for the eleventh revision of his Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale questionnaire (Barratt, 1994).  The multifactorial nature of 
impulsivity also is evident in examining the variety of some of the psychiatric disorders 
most associated with “impulsive” behavior in the DSM-IV nosological system: substance 
abuse disorders, mania, personality disorders, and attention-deficit/hyperactive disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Evenden, 1999).  Further, behavioral 
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measures that purport to measure motor impulsivity or inhibitory control deficits have not 
correlated highly with discounting tasks (de Wit, Enggasser, & Richards, 2002; 
Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006), and often find different results than discounting 
tasks (Acheson, Reynolds, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Bornovalova, Daughters, 
Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005; Crean, Richards, & de Wit, 2002; Reynolds et al., 
2007).  Finally, the positive correlation observed between delay and probabilistic 
discounting tasks, where a negative correlation would indicate the same underlying 
process, and the domain independence between constructs such as money and health, 
argues against a unitary impulsivity construct (Green & Myerson, 2004). 
Correlation between Discounting Tasks and Questionnaires 
 Individuals demonstrating impulsive behavior such as substance abuse, 
gambling, aggressive behavior, and trichotillomania have scored higher on impulsivity 
questionnaires than controls (Barratt, 1994; Carlton & Manowitz, 1994; Kennedy & 
Grubin, 1990; McCown, 1989; Stein, Islam, Cohen, DeCaria, & Hollander, 1995).  
Additionally, self-report impulsivity questionnaires (e.g., BIS-11, I-7) usually are 
correlated with each other (Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Gerbing, Ahadi, & Patton, 1987; Lane, 
Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de 
Wit, 2006). 
 For the fewer number of studies that have used both self-report questionnaires 
and behavioral measures such as discounting, equivocal findings have been found in the 
correlation between these two types of measurements.  Some studies have found 
moderate correlations between self-report questionnaires (or specific subscales) and 
discounting (Bjork, Hommer, Grant, & Danube, 2004; Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Kirby, 
Petry, & Bickel, 1999; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997; Mitchell, Fields, 
D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 2007; Reynolds, 
Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999; Swann, Bjork, 
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Moeller, & Dougherty, 2002), but most studies have found low, or no, correlations 
between these measures (Crean, de Wit, & Richards, 2000; Crean, Richards, & de Wit, 
2002; de Wit, Enggasser, & Richards, 2002; Dom, De Wilde, Hulstijn, Van Den Brink, & 
Sabbe, 2006; Gerbing, Ahadi, & Patton, 1987; Kirby & Petry, 2004; Lane, Cherek, 
Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; Mitchell, 1999; Ortner, MacDonald, & 
Olmstead, 2003; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Reynolds, Richards, 
Horn, & Karraker, 2004; White et al., 1994).  For the studies that have demonstrated 
correlations, the correlations have, for the most part, been in the expected direction 
(e.g., Coffey, Gudleski, Saladin, & Brady, 2003).  For example, Richards et al. (1999) 
found that individuals with the steepest discounting rates also scored highest on 
personality measures of impulsivity.  The authors noted that this was more remarkable 
given the fact that few of the questions on the personality tests actually referred to the 
discounting of future consequences. Mitchell (1999) also notes that what appears as a 
problematic weak relationship between self-report and behavioral measures of 
impulsivity is actually intuitive when considering that different scales of personality 
questionnaires have been developed to specifically measure different components of 
impulsivity, and these scales have been developed to be independent of the other scales 
on the same questionnaire.  Thus, expectations of a strong relationship between any 
questionnaire and behavioral tasks of impulsivity may be too lofty given the 
multidimensional nature of impulsivity.   
 Further research has examined whether self-report and behavioral measures are 
measuring the same constructs.  Along with finding no correlation between self-report 
and behavioral tasks, a principal-components analysis of the behavioral tasks 
determined that they appeared to measure either “impulsive disinhibition” or “impulsive 
decision-making;” the delay discounting task fell into the latter category (Reynolds, 
Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  Other studies also have concluded that the ability 
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to inhibit responses is not correlated with the ability to delay rewards (Lane, Cherek, 
Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; Sonuga-Barke, 2002; Swann, Bjork, Moeller, 
& Dougherty, 2002).  Thus, both self-report questionnaires and behavioral measures 
may be multifactorial, measuring different components of impulsivity.  
 Another viewpoint holds that discounting tasks may instead be conceptualized as 
an index of impulsivity or a mechanism behind impulsivity, rather than as an assessment 
of the construct of impulsivity, as questionnaire measures attempt to do (Baker, 
Johnson, & Bickel, 2003).  In other words, discounting tasks may provide a more 
comprehensive, construct-relevant indicator of impulsivity than do trait measures 
because of their ability to describe specific preferences depending on the commodities 
used, for example, and whether the decision point is phrased as a gain or a loss (Baker, 
Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Petry, 2001b).  
 Regardless, it is clear that the psychometrics of impulsivity is in need of further 
research.  Exploring the relationship between self-report and behavioral measures of 
impulsivity would not only aid the theoretical discussion of the components of impulsivity, 
but also may suggest what discounting tasks measure specifically.  Furthermore, even if 
this relationship is not explicated fully, using these measures both in specific clinical 
groups as well as in the general population and measuring their predictive validity for 
future behavior will likely remain a priority area of research (Green & Myerson, 2004; 
Mitchell, 1999).  
Impulsivity and Binge Eating 
Introduction 
 Eating and weight disorders provide a suitable opportunity for examining 
behavioral choices involving impulsivity.  In order to establish habits that are easier to 
follow, and to delineate a ‘right’ from a ‘wrong’ choice, individuals often perceive choices 
as setting precedents for their future choices.  Although this system may work well for 
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choices such as whether or not to abuse drugs, or whether or not to gamble, it appears 
to work less well for the continuous judgments necessary in areas of complex 
ambivalence, such as choosing food (Ainslie, 2001; Rachlin, 2000).  Viewing a lapse in 
one’s diet as a precedent for future choices can reduce one’s hope for future self-control, 
a dichotomous thinking style that characterizes many individuals who regain their lost 
weight, as well as for binge eaters (Ainslie, 2001; Byrne, Cooper, & Fairburn, 2003; 
Cohen & Petrie, 2005).  Additionally, food choices mirror discounting choices when 
considering either healthy foods now to maximize future health at the expense of current 
taste, or choosing unhealthy foods now to maximize current taste at the expense of 
future health. 
 In a less theoretical and more experimental realm, self-report measures of 
impulsivity have been found to predict food intake in normal-weight women (Guerrieri, 
Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2007; Guerrieri et al., 2007), and poor treatment outcome in 
anorectic women (Fichter, Quadflieg, & Hedlund, 2006).  Further, the urgency subscale 
of the UPPS questionnaire predicted bulimic symptomatology in one study (Anestis, 
Selby, & Joiner, 2007), and another study found women who had elevated scores on the 
disinhibition scale of the Three Factor Eating Questionnaire also had elevated scores on 
questionnaire and behavioral measures of impulsivity (BIS-11 and delay discounting 
task, respectively; Yeomans, Leitch, & Mobini, 2008). 
 Binge eating, a hallmark feature of bulimia nervosa and binge eating disorder 
(BED), involves a sense of loss of control over what one is eating (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994).  Because binge eating is considered an impulsive behavior, much 
research has examined the connection between impulsivity and eating disorders, 
especially eating disorders that involve binge eating.  However, no studies have used 
behavioral tasks such as discounting that could examine impulsivity in decision-making 
in this population.  
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 Individuals who binge eat have been shown to have higher rates of Cluster B 
personality disorders (e.g., borderline, histrionic, narcissistic) with their accompanying 
traits of impulsivity and interpersonal instability (Grilo, 2002; Herzog, Keller, Lavori, 
Kenny, & Sacks, 1992; Karwautz, Troop, Rabe-Hesketh, Collier, & Treasure, 2003; 
Mitchell & Mussell, 1995; O'Brien & Vincent, 2003; Steiger, Thibaudeau, Ghadirian, & 
Houle, 1992).  Some studies suggest that eating disordered individuals with personality 
disorders have greater psychopathology but no worse eating disorder symptoms (Fahy 
& Eisler, 1993; Grilo et al., 2003; Johnson, Tobin, & Dennis, 1990; Steiger, Thibaudeau, 
Leung, Houle, & Ghadirian, 1994; Wolfe, Jimerson, & Levine, 1994; Wonderlich & Swift, 
1990), whereas others suggest that personality pathology (especially Cluster B traits and 
impulsivity) is associated with more severe binge eating (Bruce & Steiger, 2005; Favaro 
et al., 2005; Newton, Freeman, & Munro, 1993; Stice et al., 2001; Wilfley et al., 2000).  
One seminal study of 709 women with eating disorders found that of the 118 women 
diagnosed with an impulse-control disorder, all but three engaged in binge eating, and 
those 115 individuals had more severe eating disorders and greater general 
psychopathology than the women with an eating disorder who did not have an impulse-
control disorder (Fernandez-Aranda et al., 2008).  As with other personality constructs, 
impulsivity has been shown to vary among individuals and across diagnostic categories 
(Cassin & von Ranson, 2005; Strober, 1983; Vitousek & Manke, 1994), but it remains to 
be seen whether consistent group patterns would be found when modeling behavior on 
discounting tasks.  
Bulimia Nervosa 
 Research has found consistently that individuals with bulimia nervosa score 
higher on impulsivity self-report measures than both individuals without bulimia nervosa 
(Cassin & von Ranson, 2005; Claes, Vandereycken, & Vertommen, 2002; Kane, Loxton, 
Staiger, & Dawe, 2004; Newton, Freeman, & Munro, 1993; Rosval et al., 2006; Steiger 
41 
 
et al., 2004; Steiger et al., 2001; Wolfe, Jimerson, & Levine, 1994) and individuals with 
restricting anorexia nervosa (Cassin & von Ranson, 2005; Claes, Vandereycken, & 
Vertommen, 2002; Fahy & Eisler, 1993; Rosval et al., 2006; Vervaet, van Heeringen, & 
Audenaert, 2004), but these studies did not use psychiatric controls, nor did they control 
for other impulsive behaviors.  One study that used community samples of women with 
either lifetime substance abuse, affective disorder, bulimia nervosa, or no 
psychopathology found similar rates of self-report impulsivity among these groups; 
however, it also reported that women with more than one disorder were more impulsive 
than women with just one of these disorders (Bushnell, Wells, & Oakley-Browne, 1996).  
Another study using factor analysis determined that among individuals with bulimia 
nervosa or bulimic pathology, having both high impulsivity and compulsivity produced 
more impairment on eating disorder and depressive indices than elevated scores on 
either dimension alone (Engel et al., 2005).  Several other cluster analytic studies have 
found evidence for three classes of bulimic individuals, one of which is an “impulsive” 
class (Goldner, Srikameswaran, Schroeder, Livesley, & Birmingham, 1999; Strober, 
1983; Westen & Harnden-Fischer, 2001; Wonderlich et al., 2005), and another latent 
class analysis study found a two-class characterization of bulimia nervosa, one with 
several markers of impulsivity such as substance use and antisocial behavior (Duncan et 
al., 2005). 
 Based on Lacey and Evans’ (1986) proposition that a “multi-impulsive” subgroup 
of bulimics exist with poorer treatment prognosis, later studies further examined this 
phenomenon.  Approximately half of two other bulimia nervosa samples met criteria for 
Lacey’s multi-impulsive bulimia nervosa (Fahy & Eisler, 1993; Newton, Freeman, & 
Munro, 1993), although the amount of impulsivity did not discriminate treatment 
response at follow-up (Fahy & Eisler, 1993).  Latent class analyses further supported 
this clinical classification of a multi-impulsive subtype of bulimia nervosa (Myers et al., 
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2006).  In a review of the prevalence of alcohol use disorders in bulimia nervosa, the 
median prevalence of alcohol abuse or dependence was calculated as 22.9% (Bulik et 
al., 2004; Holderness, Brooks-Gunn, & Warren, 1994), and bulimics with comorbid 
alcohol abuse were found to score higher on impulsivity measures than bulimics without 
alcohol abuse (Kane, Loxton, Staiger, & Dawe, 2004).  Another study found that women 
with bulimia nervosa plus a lifetime impulse-control disorder scored higher on novelty 
seeking and impulsivity indices, and general psychopathology, than women with bulimia 
nervosa without an impulse-control disorder (Fernandez-Aranda et al., 2006).  Thus, the 
literature suggests that individuals with bulimia nervosa are more impulsive than 
controls, but may only be more impulsive than other psychiatric controls in the presence 
of comorbid substance abuse or impulse-control disorder. 
  Even if individuals with bulimia nervosa are indeed more impulsive than other 
eating disordered individuals, it is not clear that impulsivity negatively impacts treatment 
prognosis (Keel & Mitchell, 1997).  A number of studies have found a positive correlation 
between baseline impulsivity problems and poor treatment outcome (Fichter, Quadflieg, 
& Rief, 1994; Johnson-Sabine, Reiss, & Dayson, 1992; Keel, Mitchell, Miller, Davis, & 
Crow, 2000; Rossiter, Agras, Telch, & Schneider, 1993; Sohlberg, Norring, Holmgren, & 
Rosmark, 1989; Vaz, 1998), or between impulsivity and premature discontinuation of 
therapy (Agras et al., 2000), whereas others have found no relation between impulsivity 
and eating disorder outcome (Edelstein, Yager, Gitlin, & Landsverk, 1989; Fahy & Eisler, 
1993; Wonderlich, Fullerton, Swift, & Klein, 1994), or even a relation between baseline 
impulsivity scores and a favorable response to treatment (Fassino et al., 2005).  
However, most studies reviewed suggest that impulse-control problems predict a poorer 
treatment outcome for women diagnosed with bulimia nervosa (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, 2004; Keel & Mitchell, 1997), even if this poorer outcome is in 
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regards to comorbid psychiatric functioning rather than the course of the eating disorder 
(Bruce & Steiger, 2005; Grilo, 2002).  
 A poorer response to treatment makes intuitive sense when reviewing studies 
that show two mechanisms underlying the development of bulimia nervosa: dietary 
restraint and disinhibition/affective instability (Steiger, Lehoux, & Gauvin, 1999; Vitousek 
& Manke, 1994).  If treatment is focused on normalizing dietary restraint, it would appear 
that this would be less effective for those who have more problems with impulsivity 
(Vervaet, van Heeringen, & Audenaert, 2004).  Finally, it may be that impulsivity in 
eating disorders are more state-dependent (i.e., reliant on the eating disorder symptoms) 
than trait-dependent given that impulsivity has appeared to improve following recovery 
from bulimia nervosa (Ames-Frankel et al., 1992).  
Binge Eating Disorder and Obesity 
 Much less research has examined the relationship between impulsivity and either 
BED or obesity, even though the clinical DSM-IV definition of BED includes a number of 
criteria that could be considered impulsive, such as lack of control over eating (Cassin & 
von Ranson, 2005; Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004).  Within individuals diagnosed with 
BED, prevalence rates of borderline personality disorder (characterized by impulsive 
traits) have been shown to be approximately 9% on average, compared to approximately 
1% in the general population (Telch & Stice, 1998; van Hanswijick de Jonge, van Furth, 
Lacey, & Waller, 2003; Widiger & Weissman, 1991; Wilfley et al., 2000; Yanovski, 
Nelson, Dubbert, & Spitzer, 1993); a similar relationship has been found among 
individuals with ADHD (characterized by impulsive traits) and BED (Cortese, Bernardina, 
& Mouren, 2007).  Impulsive traits found in Cluster B personality disorders also have 
predicted poorer treatment response in individuals with BED (Stice et al., 2001; Wilfley et 
al., 2000).  Individuals with BED have been found to be more impulsive than obese 
individuals without BED (de Zwaan et al., 1994; Fassino et al., 2002; Galanti, Gluck, & 
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Geliebter, 2007; Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004; van Hanswijick de Jonge, van Furth, 
Lacey, & Waller, 2003), more impulsive than obese individuals with subthreshold BED 
(Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004), and to engage in binge eating more impulsively 
(versus obsessing beforehand) than individuals with bulimia nervosa (Raymond et al., 
1999).  Further, one study found impulsivity scores to be positively correlated with BED 
criteria (e.g., ‘loss of control during a binge’, ‘eating when not physically hungry’; Nasser, 
Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004), and another study found impulsivity to be the greatest 
predictor of test meal intake, accounting for 16% of the variance (Galanti, Gluck, & 
Geliebter, 2007).  However, one study did not find obese individuals with BED to differ 
on impulsivity compared to nonbinging obese (Davis, Levitan, Carter et al., 2007).  
Another study found that individuals with BED who had a lifetime diagnosis of alcohol or 
drug abuse or dependence were more impulsive than individuals with BED without this 
comorbidity (Peterson, Miller, Crow, Thuras, & Mitchell, 2005).  In sum, the majority of 
questionnaire-based research states that individuals with BED are more impulsive than 
obese individuals without BED, and that these impulsive traits may impact food intake 
and the behavioral characteristics of BED.  Table 1 provides a summary of the studies 
on BED and impulsivity.   
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Table 1. 
Binge Eating Disorder Studies on Impulsivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BED: Binge Eating Disorder; BE: Binge Eater; OE: Overeater (no loss of control); BN: Bulimia Nervosa 
Sig: significantly; * Tellegen, 1985; ** Raymond & Christensen, 1999 
Study Subjects Impulsivity Measure Results 
de Zwaan et al., 1994 43 BED, 20 
BE, 15 OE 
(all obese) 
Multidimensional 
Personality 
Questionnaire* 
BED sig. more impulsive than BE 
and OE. 
Raymond et al., 1999 31 BN, 39 
BED 
Binge Eating 
Behavior 
Questionnaire** 
BN binge eating behavior more 
obsessive (vs. impulsive) than BED. 
Fassino et al., 2002 59 BED, 61 
non-BED, 80 
controls 
Temperament and 
Character Inventory 
BED and non-BED obese sig. more 
impulsive than control.  
Nasser et al., 2004 11 BED, 11 
BE, 11 obese 
controls  
Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale-11 
BED sig. higher motor impulsivity 
(but not cognitive or non-planning) 
than controls. BIS correlated with 
severity of binge traits.  
Peterson et al., 2005 84 BED Multidimensional 
Personality 
Questionnaire* 
BED with lifetime history of alcohol 
or drug abuse/dependence more 
impulsive than BED without history. 
Galanti et al., 2007 22 BED, 21 
BE, 36 obese 
controls 
Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale-11 
BED and BE sig. more impulsive 
than non-BED. Test meal intake 
correlated with BIS. 
Davis et al., 2007 53 BED, 52 
obese, 59  
controls 
Barratt Impulsivity 
Scale-11 
BED and Obese not sig. different, 
but more impulsive than normal-
weight controls. 
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 The association between impulsivity and obesity also has been examined.  Some 
studies have found obese individuals with or without binge eating to be more impulsive 
than normal-weight healthy controls when measured by questionnaire (Davis, Levitan, 
Carter et al., 2007; Faith, Flint, Fairburn, Goodwin, & Allison, 2001; Fassino et al., 2002; 
Ryden et al., 2004) or behaviorally (Nederkoorn, Smulders, Havermans, Roefs, & 
Jansen, 2006).  A review of borderline personality disorder and obesity found increased 
rates of borderline personality disorder only in obese individuals seeking psychological 
care, or in those who had BED (Sansone, Wiederman, & Sansone, 2000).  Several 
smaller studies have found greater impulsivity to be associated with less weight loss 
(Bjorvell, Edman, & Schalling, 1989; Jonsson, Bjorvell, Levander, & Rossner, 1986) or 
high treatment attrition (Bjorvell & Edman, 1989), but two other studies using the same 
impulsivity measure did not find a relation between impulsivity and 1-year weight-loss 
relapse status (Bjorvell, Aly, Langius, & Nordstrom, 1994; Poston et al., 1999).  The 
authors suggest that, although impulsivity may not predict weight outcome, it is still likely 
that it may predict intermediate health behaviors that act as mediators of weight 
outcome.  Another larger-scale study found a questionnaire measure of impulsivity to be 
unchanged at the 2-year follow-up of a weight loss intervention in severely obese 
individuals (Ryden et al., 2004).  Thus, impulsivity as it is associated with BED and 
obesity is in need of further study to better determine the mechanisms by which these 
conditions arise and are maintained. 
Clinical Implications 
 As mentioned previously, discounting measures have the potential to assess a 
variety of clinical populations in which impulsive choices are a source of distress 
(Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  If various clinical populations are found to differ in the way 
they discount rewards, then discounting could be used to distinguish populations.  
Differences in impulsivity also may vary in a way that affects the etiology or maintenance 
47 
 
of these disorders, with consequent implications for treatment interventions, as well as 
the role of discounting as an outcome measure (Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Critchfield & 
Kollins, 2001; Kirby & Petry, 2004).  Further, results from behavioral discounting 
procedures may increase our understanding of impulsivity by facilitating analyses of the 
variables affecting discounting and the behavioral process that results in impulsivity and 
loss of control (Bickel & Marsch, 2001).  If discounting is found to distinguish 
populations, with the indicated need for tailored interventions, then interventions for 
increasing self-control (and thus decreasing impulsivity) may be used in this venture. 
 For example, external controls put into place by precommitment strategies can 
work to lessen the chance of an impulsive decision by a vulnerable individual.  As a 
classic illustration, Odysseus was able to successfully resist the call of the Sirens by 
ordering his crew to tie him to his mast (Ainslie, 1975).  Other precommitment strategies 
include irrevocable contracts and compulsory savings plans made at an earlier timepoint 
in order to make it difficult or impossible to change one’s mind at a later timepoint 
(Ainslie, 1975; Rachlin, 1989).  Another strategy, borrowed from the delay-of-gratification 
literature in young children, is the use of self-distraction when waiting for a reward.  
Being engaged in an alternate activity and focusing on the abstract traits (e.g., the 
pretzels looks like logs) versus positive traits of the reward (e.g., pretzels taste salty, 
crunchy), can increase self-control (Ainslie, 1975; Binder, Dixon, & Ghezzi, 2000; 
Bourget & White, 1984; Eisenberger & Adornetto, 1986; Mischel, 1984; Rachlin, 1989).  
Another method that has shown effectiveness in substance abuse treatment is that of 
contingency-management procedures that involve frequent tangible reinforcers (e.g., gift 
certificates) when the target behavior (e.g., meeting attendance) is demonstrated, and 
rewards that are withheld if the target behavior does not occur (Bickel, Amass, Higgins, 
Badger, & Esch, 1997; Dallery & Raiff, 2007; Higgins et al., 1994; Petry, 2000); 
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contingencies have been found to be more effective than a nicotine patch in sustaining 
abstinence (Dallery & Raiff, 2007).  
Treatment Implications from Discounting 
 Studies that have used the discounting paradigm with clinical populations 
(usually substance abusers) have noted that rewards or punishers delayed in time, such 
as increased health or jail time, are discounted steeply by these populations, and thus 
may not effectively modify these deleterious behaviors (Giordano et al., 2002; Kirby & 
Petry, 2004; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999).  Instead, programs that offer immediate, 
tangible rewards, such as those made available in contingency-management 
procedures, would better provide alternative reinforcers that compete with the rewarding 
effects of the negative behavior.  The inconsistencies in discounting discussed earlier 
also provide direction for ‘exploiting’ these biases so as to create more effective 
interventions (Chapman & Elstein, 1995).  For example, the magnitude effect, that 
discount rates are less steep for large-magnitude delayed outcomes, suggests that the 
potential to influence appropriate choice behavior would increase if future health 
outcomes were viewed as important or large by the individual (Chapman & Elstein, 
1995).  Similarly, the sign effect, that delayed health losses are discounted more steeply 
than health gains, implies that supporting preventive behavior by framing choices as 
affecting future health benefits (e.g., increased health and longevity) may be more 
effective than framing choices as future health problems (e.g., heart disease, diabetes; 
Odum, Madden, & Bickel, 2002).  Finally, given that impulsivity has been reduced 
through behavioral training in several populations (Binder, Dixon, & Ghezzi, 2000; Dixon, 
Rehfeldt, & Randich, 2003; Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & Bohus, 2004), it is 
feasible that novel treatments could be developed that reduce the effect of delay on 
reinforcer value, or that focus on altering the time perspective of patients in order to 
lower their discounting rates (Kirby & Petry, 2004; Odum, Madden, & Bickel, 2002). 
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Relevance to Eating Disorders and Obesity 
When an individual decides to lose weight, this decision is not a solitary choice, 
but a choice that has to be made almost continuously throughout the day in choosing the 
healthier food or in choosing not to eat more than desired (Reynolds & Schiffbauer, 
2005).  Indeed, one study found that individuals made an average of 226.7 food - and 
beverage - related decisions per day, much higher than the average 14.4 decisions 
these participants estimated (Wansink & Sobal, 2007).  When viewed in this manner, it 
becomes more apparent that eating and weight disorders cannot be viewed separately 
from the personality characteristics, such as impulsivity, that shape and maintain them 
(Bruce & Steiger, 2005; Wonderlich & Mitchell, 1997).  This may be especially pertinent 
to the investigation of BED, especially in regard to the impulsivity literature already 
reviewed.  Several studies have shown that dieting is not a necessary condition for binge 
eating to occur in BED (e.g., Grilo & Masheb, 2000; Spitzer et al., 1992; Spurrell, Wilfley, 
Tanofsky, & Brownell, 1997).  Indeed, an apparent absence of association between 
dietary control and the urge to binge has been observed in impulsive individuals 
(Steiger, Lehoux, & Gauvin, 1999; Vervaet, van Heeringen, & Audenaert, 2004).  Thus, it 
may be that the current treatments for binge eating aimed at relaxing dietary restraint 
may not be as effective as treatments that are aimed at improving self-regulation and 
impulse-control skills, as a pilot study of dialectical behavior therapy for BED has 
suggested (Telch, Agras, & Linehan, 2001).  Regardless, basic research is needed on 
the psychological factors influencing choice behavior. 
 It is not known whether individuals with eating or weight problems ascribe greater 
value to food and/or sedentary activity than individuals without these problems.  
Although food is essential for all humans, individual variations exist in the reinforcing 
value of food (Reiss & Havercamp, 1996).  It is not difficult to extend this model of 
differing reward values and postulate that differences in body weight and success in 
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obesity and binge-eating treatments may be the result of individual differences in the 
reinforcing value of food.  Subjective reports have shown that overweight and obese 
adults report a higher value for eating and less enjoyment of non-eating activities than 
normal-weight individuals (Doell & Hawkins, 1982; Jacobs & Wagner, 1984).  In 
extending this work to delineate the possible distinction between obese and non-obese 
individuals, Saelens and Epstein (1996) examined the reinforcing value of food in obese 
versus non-obese women using a concurrent schedule computer task.  The obese 
participants rated food as more reinforcing than sedentary activity compared to the non-
obese group.  The use of a discounting procedure in the proposed study could similarly 
help differentiate obese from non-obese, and binge eaters from non-binge eaters, in 
terms of impulsive behavior, self-control, and the value of rewards such as food.  Using 
the discounting framework in conjunction with self-report measures may lead to 
indications of the determinants of food choice among obese individuals and/or binge 
eaters. 
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
I. The first aim of this study is to compare degree of discounting of delayed and 
probabilistic food (an immediately consumable, potentially ‘abused’ reinforcer), 
money (a conditioned reinforcer, nonconsumable, not potentially ‘abused’), 
sedentary activity (an immediately nonconsumable, potentially ‘abused’ reinforcer), 
and massage time (an immediately nonconsumable, not potentially ‘abused’ 
reinforcer) among women who are: (1) obese binge-eaters diagnosed with BED, (2) 
obese non-binge-eaters, and (3) normal-weight, non-binge-eaters.   
If obese participants (binge-eaters and non-binge-eaters) have a general 
impulsivity problem, then they should discount food and sedentary activity equally 
steeply, and more steeply than the non-obese participants.  If obese participants find 
food uniquely reinforcing, then both obese groups should discount food more steeply 
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than the other immediately consumable rewards, and more steeply than the non-
obese participants.  For delayed rewards, all groups should discount food 
significantly more steeply than money (see Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; 
Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; Odum & Rainaud, 2003).  If delayed money is 
discounted less steeply than the three other immediate reinforcers in all three 
groups, such a finding would indicate that it is the timing of the reinforcer that is the 
important variable, and not the content of the reward.  For probability discounting, it 
has previously been found that non-obese participants show little differential effect in 
the discounting among rewards; it is unclear whether a differential effect in 
discounting between rewards will be found in this new population, or whether the 
obese participants will differ from non-obese participants in probability discounting.  
The differences in discounting among the groups will provide information on the 
possible impulsivity differences between these groups, and the differences in 
discounting between the rewards will provide information on the reinforcing value of 
food versus sedentary activity and money. See Table 2 for an outline of the 
properties of the rewards.     
Table 2.   
Properties of Rewards Used  
Reward Immediately 
Reinforcing 
Potential for 
“abuse” 
Consumable 
Money    
Food X X X 
Sedentary  
Activity  
X X  
Massage  X   
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II. The second aim of this study is to determine whether severity of obesity (as 
measured by BMI) and/or severity of binge eating (as measured by number of 
objectively large binges per week) are correlated with the participant’s degree of 
delay and probability discounting.  It is expected that, similar to previous studies 
(Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 
2005; Reynolds, 2004), obesity and binge eating severity will be correlated with the 
degree of discounting delayed rewards, but will not be correlated with the degree of 
discounting probabilistic rewards, given the previous literature suggests this pattern. 
III. The third aim of this study is to determine whether a participant’s comorbid general 
psychopathology, especially comorbid substance abuse, is correlated with the 
participant’s degree of delay and probability discounting.  It is hypothesized that 
comorbidity will be positively correlated with the “immediately consumable” rewards 
of food, sedentary activity, and massage time.   
IV. The fourth aim of this study is to explore convergent and discriminative validity of 
impulsivity assessments by comparing questionnaire measures of self-control and 
impulsivity to the behavioral-discounting computerized measure.  It is expected that 
the questionnaire and behavioral measures will be weakly correlated, but in a 
positive direction.  
V. The fifth aim of this study is to evaluate the magnitude effect, determining if the effect 
of amount on discounting is observed with different types of non-monetary rewards, 
and within these participant groups.  It is expected that larger delayed amounts of 
rewards will be discounted less steeply than smaller delayed amounts, whereas 
larger probabilistic rewards will be discounted more steeply than smaller probabilistic 
rewards.  
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Significance of Proposed Research 
 Obesity is an increasingly prevalent health problem in the United States, with 
22.3% of the adult population meeting criteria for obesity (National Heart Lung and Blood 
Institute, 1998).  Obesity is associated with many adverse health consequences that are 
among the leading causes of death in the US (National Task Force on the Prevention 
and Treatment of Obesity, 2000a).  Obese individuals with BED exhibit levels of eating 
disorder psychopathology and higher rates of psychiatric comorbidity than obese 
individuals without BED.  In addition, binge eating impedes weight-loss efforts (Brody, 
Walsh, & Devlin, 1994; Eldredge & Agras, 1996; McGuire, Wing, Klem, Lang, & Hill, 
1999; Orzano & Scott, 2004; Wilfley, Schwartz, Spurrell, & Fairburn, 2000; Wilson, 
Nonas, & Rosenblum, 1993; Yanovski et al., 1992).  A better understanding is needed of 
the mechanisms and traits behind choice behavior such as binge eating and the 
behaviors leading to obesity in order to both develop and refine treatments for both 
disorders. 
 The concept of discounting offers a theoretical approach relevant to issues of 
impulsivity and self-control, such as that seen in individuals who binge eat (e.g., Bickel & 
Marsch, 2001; Logue, 1988).  The use of a discounting procedure in the current study 
could help differentiate these groups in terms of impulsive behavior, self-control, and the 
value of rewards such as food.  It is difficult for most individuals to focus on long-term 
benefits over short-term benefits, but it may be even more difficult for obese individuals 
or individuals with BED.  Thus far, no study has examined the discounting of ‘abused’ 
rewards compared to other immediately reinforcing rewards in a clinical population such 
as individuals with eating disorders.   
Merging the fields of basic science and clinical research has the potential to 
uncover novel methods of prevention and treatment strategies.  For example, if 
discounting and its relation to impulsivity distinguish among the groups, then prevention 
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and treatment programs could be matched more specifically to individuals (Bickel & 
Marsch, 2001); identifying subgroups of more impulsive individuals who respond less 
well to treatment can lead to the development of more intensive treatments tailored to 
their specific strengths and weaknesses (Keel & Mitchell, 1997).  The current study is 
conceived of as an initial step in determining whether the discounting paradigm should 
be explored further in these populations.  Importantly, if these groups are found to differ 
in their degree of discounting, this finding also could be examined within the context of 
predictive validity for treatment outcomes, not just for binge eating or obesity 
interventions, but in other impulsive disorders, such as substance abuse, as well.  
Because delay and probability discounting have been found to have differential stability 
(of individual differences) and absolute stability (of group means), further predictive 
validity studies would be a logical next step (Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 
2006).  Understanding the central properties of eating behavior, such as the value that 
food holds to individuals, can aid in developing interventions for “abnormal” eating that 
might lead to obesity and eating disorders.  This is the first study to use discounting in a 
clinical eating disorder and obese population, as well as the first discounting study to 
compare immediately consumable rewards in any clinical sample.    
METHOD 
Participants 
 The number of participants targeted for enrollment was chosen based on the 
effect size for discount rates in Kirby and Petry’s (2003) examination of substance users 
versus controls (d = 0.90).  Estimating a medium to large effect size with power of 0.80 
to detect an effect using an ANOVA, the necessary total number of participants was 
calculated to be 90, with 30 participants in each group (Cohen, 1992).  The BED group 
consisted of 30 obese [Body Mass Index (BMI) ≥ 30] female adults (ages 18 to 65) 
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meeting DSM-IV BED criteria2 (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  The obese 
group consisted of 30 obese (BMI ≥ 30), non-binge-eating3, female adults similar in age, 
ethnicity, and education to the BED group participants.  The control group consisted of 
30 normal-weight (BMI between 18 and 27), non-binge-eating female adults similar in 
age, race, and education to the BED group participants.   
 Interested participants were contacted by phone to determine initial eligibility 
criteria.  Because participants needed to participate in tasks requiring sustained attention 
and a level of reading comprehension, exclusion criteria included the following: 
psychosis within the past 3 months, severe (suicidal) depression within the past 3 
months, mental retardation, reading level below the 6th grade level, and past traumatic 
head injury.  Further exclusion criteria included pregnancy, due to its impact on weight, 
and not being within driving distance of Washington University.  To meet eating 
pathology criteria for the BED or obese group, participants had to meet DSM-IV BED 
criteria, or the non-binge-eating criteria, respectively.  The control and obese groups 
were recruited to be as similar to the BED group as possible in terms of education, 
income, race, and age by continuously assessing these variables during recruitment.  If 
a potential participant assessed over the phone was determined to engage in subclinical 
or other eating disorder behavior such as purging, she was offered treatment referrals.  
 Participants were recruited from the St. Louis area using Volunteers for Health, 
newspaper advertisements, phone logs from previous studies (when the participant had 
given permission for further contact), and flyers posted in the community (e.g., at 
community centers).  Potential participants were instructed to call a designated number if 
                                                 
2
 BED criteria: Recurrent (average at least 2 times/week) episodes of binge eating (eating an 
amount of food in a discrete period of time that most people would consider unambiguously large, 
with a sense of loss of control) over the past six months. Absence of regular use of inappropriate 
compensatory behaviors (e.g., vomiting). 
3
 Non-binge eating is defined as < 3 binges in the past six months and no more than one binge in 
any one month 
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they were interested in participating in an experiment on eating and women’s health.  All 
eligible participants were offered $30 in compensation for their participation and free 
group Behavioral Weight Loss (BWL) treatment at a later date.  
 Two hundred twenty women contacted the study with interest in participation, or 
were provided by Volunteers for Health as possibly eligible and interested participants. 
Of this number, 114 women were excluded due to not meeting eligibility criteria, not 
being interested in participating, or failing to attend the baseline assessment (see Figure 
5).  An additional 16 women were excluded after the in-person assessment.  All women 
who did not meet study eligibility requirements were offered appropriate referrals, if 
desired.  The remaining 90 women were considered eligible for participation and 
completed the study on the day of the in-person assessment.  The phone screen 
procedure and full assessment battery was conducted initially on 15 interested female 
pilot participants who were studied, even if they engaged in subclinical eating behavior. 
They were offered the same amount of monetary and treatment compensation as the 
final study participants. 
Figure 5.  
Participant Recruitment 
 
 
  
 
Included Participants 
 N 
Binge eating disorder 30 
Obese without BED 30 
Normal-weight with no eating pathology 30 
TOTAL INCLUDED 90 
Reason for exclusion after phone screen 
 N 
Subjective bulimic episodes 33 
Unable to contact 18 
Did not arrive at appointment 11 
Compensatory behaviors 9 
No longer interested 9 
Potential Participants (n = 220) 
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Ineligible BMI (b/t 27 & 30) 7 
Over age 65 7 
Unable to screen/Unclear 
eating episodes 
5 
No longer needed (on waitlist 
at end of study) 
3 
Subthreshold BED 4 
Bulimia nervosa 2 
Non-purging bulimia nervosa 2 
Wanted medical exam  1 
Too familiar with study aims  1 
Cognitive deficits 1 
No transportation  1 
TOTAL EXCLUDED 114 
Reason for Exclusion after In-person Assessment 
 
 N 
Subjective bulimic episodes 10 
Subthreshold BED 4 
Compensatory behaviors 1 
Night eating syndrome  1 
TOTAL EXCLUDED 16 
GRAND TOTAL EXCLUDED 130 
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Materials 
Phone Screen Measures 
 During the phone screen, before the initial eligibility criteria were determined, 
demographic information (age, ethnicity, education, income, marital status, and contact 
information) was collected.  Once initial eligibility requirements were met, an in-person 
assessment was scheduled.  
Rewards Chosen 
 For discounting tasks, money typically has been used as the reward offered to 
participants.  This paradigm has been extended to use rewards that serve as an 
“abused” substance, such as the drug of choice for substance abusers (e.g., Kirby & 
Petry, 2004).  Other rewards have included future health (e.g., Chapman & Elstein, 
1995; MacKeigan, Larson, Draugalis, Bootman, & Burns, 1993), food and alcohol (e.g., 
Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Kirby & Guastello, 2001), and freedom (avoiding 
jail; Petry, 2003).  The present study used the discounting tasks not only as a measure 
of at least one form of impulsivity, but also as a measure of how the clinical populations 
of binge eaters and obese viewed the reinforcing values of the rewards food and 
sedentary activity as compared to the widely recognized reward of money.  
 Further, some researchers (e.g., Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Odum & 
Rainaud, 2003) have proposed recently that it is the immediacy and consumability of 
rewards such as illicit drugs that is the reason they are discounted more steeply than 
money, and not necessarily the reward’s abuse potential itself.  For example, unlike 
drugs, food, or sedentary activity that has to be immediately ‘consumed’ or used, money 
can be saved over time, which complicates the effects of delay.  Thus, the control 
reward of massage time was conceived as a reward that serves as an immediate 
reward, like food and sedentary activity, but one that is not ‘abused.’  In other words, one 
aim of this study was to discern whether it is the immediacy/consumability of the reward 
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that is the important variable, or whether it is the reward itself that is the important 
variable. 
Delay and Probability Discounting Tasks 
 Most studies that have used discounting tasks have used hypothetical rewards 
due to the cost of providing real rewards, but some researchers have discussed the 
validity of this procedure (e.g., Bickel & Marsch, 2001; Critchfield & Kollins, 2001).  
However, research has shown that individuals discount real rewards similarly to 
hypothetical rewards (Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 
1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Lagorio & Madden, 2005; Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & 
Kastern, 2003; Rodriguez & Logue, 1988).  
 To complete the discounting tasks, participants were brought individually to a 
small room containing a computer with the discounting program (written using Visual 
Basic 6.0, Microsoft 1998) and monitor.  They were provided with specific verbal as well 
as written instructions (see Appendix B) informing them that the purpose of this phase of 
the study was to examine their preferences for hypothetical amounts of money, food, 
sedentary activity, and massage time.  The type of task (delay versus probability 
discounting) was crossed with amount (100 units versus 40 units) and reward (money, 
food, sedentary activity, massage time), resulting in 16 conditions.  Each participant was 
studied in all 16 of these conditions.  Half of the participants were assigned randomly to 
receive the delay discounting tasks first, and half of the participants were assigned 
randomly to receive the probability discounting tasks first.  Within the delay or probability 
tasks, the order of reward determined randomly.  Within the reward, the order of amount 
was determined randomly.   
 For the delay discounting task, participants were instructed that two amounts of 
hypothetical reward (money, food, sedentary activity, or massage time) would appear on 
the computer screen, and that one amount could be received immediately, whereas the 
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other amount could be received after some specified period of time.  For the probability 
discounting task, participants were instructed that one amount could be received “for 
sure,” whereas the other amount could be received with some specified probability. They 
also were told that the amount of the immediate/certain rewards would change after 
each of their choices, but that the amount of the delayed/probabilistic reward would 
remain the same for a group of choices.  Participants were told that there were no 
correct or incorrect choices, and that they were to indicate their choice by clicking on 
their preferred option.  After six practice trials, the experimenter ensured the participant 
was confident in the task, after which the experiment began; however, the participant 
was informed that the experimenter was in the next room if she had problems.  For each 
type of reward, two amounts were studied: 40 units and 100 units.  For money, the units 
were dollars; for food, the units were the smallest logical amount given the participant’s 
choice (see Appendix C); for sedentary activity and massage time, the units were 
minutes.  For the delay and probability discounting tasks, the position of the 
immediate/certain amount on the screen was randomized (i.e., for any given 
delay/probability condition, the immediate/certain amount was equally likely to be 
presented to the left or right of the delayed/probabilistic amount, with this left or right 
presentation staying consistent through the given delay or probability condition, but 
varying between conditions). 
 For each delayed amount studied with the delay discounting task, the participant 
made six choices at each of five delays: 1 week, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, and 3 
years.  For this adjusting-amount algorithm, within each group of six choices, the amount 
of the immediate reward was adjusted using a staircase procedure that converges 
rapidly on the amount of immediate reward equal in subjective value to the delayed 
reward (for a detailed description of this procedure, see Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002).  
The first choice was always one-half the amount of the delayed amount.  For example, if 
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the delayed amount was $100 in six months, then the immediate amount was $50 now.  
For subsequent choices, the size of the adjustment was half of the previous adjustment.  
Thus, if the participant chose $100 in 6 months over $50 now, then the next choice was 
between $75 now and $100 in 6 months; alternatively, if the participant chose $50 now 
over $100 in 6 months, then the next choice was between $25 now and $100 in 6 
months.  This procedure was repeated until the participant made six choices.  For each 
trial, the immediate amount was representative of the current best guess of the 
subjective value of the delayed reward.  Thus, the immediate amount that would have 
been presented on the seventh trial (if it existed) was used as an estimate of the 
subjective value of the delayed reward (Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003; Myerson, Green, 
Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003).  In other words, the subjective value was the amount of the 
immediate reward approximately equal in value to the delayed reward.   
 For each probabilistic amount studied with the probability discounting task, the 
participant made six choices at each of five probabilities: 90%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 
10% chance.  An analogous adjusting-amount procedure was used to estimate the 
subjective value of probabilistic rewards.  Within each group of six choices, the amount 
of the certain reward was adjusted using a staircase procedure that converges rapidly on 
the amount of certain reward equal in subjective value to the probabilistic reward.  The 
amount that would have been presented on a seventh trial was used as an estimate of 
the subjective value of the probabilistic reward; that is, the amount of certain reward 
approximately equal in value to the probabilistic amount. 
Self-Report Measures 
 In accordance with the study’s fourth aim, two different impulsivity measures  -- 
the UPPS Impulsive Behavior Scale (UPPS; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) and the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995) -- were administered 
in order to explore the convergent and discriminative validity between the discounting 
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tasks and self-report measures.  The UPPS is a 45-item scale derived in a factor-
analytic method from the Five Factor Model of personality and is a commonly used 
impulsivity measure.  It has four subscales that are related to impulsive behaviors: 
urgency, sensation seeking, (lack of) premeditation, and (lack of) perseverance 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  These subscales have been found to differentiate eating 
disorder diagnostic categories (Claes, Vandereycken, & Vertommen, 2005; Miller, Flory, 
Lynam, & Leukefeld, 2003) and have demonstrated construct and divergent validity 
(Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005). 
 The BIS-11 is a widely used, 30-item measure of impulsivity that assesses the 
degree to which statements related to impulsiveness are associated with the individual’s 
behavior.  A total score as well as the subscales nonplanning (“planning and thinking 
carefully”), attentional impulsiveness (“focusing on the task at hand”), and motor 
impulsiveness (“acting on the spur of the moment”) are generated (Patton, Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995). This questionnaire has been normalized with a variety of groups, 
including college students and drug abusers (Allen, Moeller, Rhoades, & Cherek, 1998; 
Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995).  Cronbach’s alpha coefficients across several groups 
range from .79 to .83 (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995).  The I-7 is another often-used 
personality measure of impulsivity, but high correlations between the BIS-11 and the I-7 
(Luengo, Carrillo-De-La-Pena, & Otero, 1991), and the frequency with which BIS-11 has 
been used in eating disorder populations (e.g., Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004), led to 
its selection in this study.      
 For the purposes of confirming eating disorder diagnoses, assessing likely 
covariates of the discounting tasks, and establishing preferred food and sedentary 
rewards, the following eating measures were administered: Eating Disorder Examination 
(EDE; Fairburn & Cooper, 1993), the Eating Disorder Examination-Questionnaire (EDE-
Q; Black & Wilson, 1996; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994), the restraint scale of the Dutch 
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Eating Behavior Scale (DEBQ-R; van Strien, Frijters, Bergers, & Defares, 1986), a 
Visual Analogue Scale assessing hunger (VAS; Flint, Raben, Blundell, & Astrup, 2000), 
a Snack Preference Measure (SPM; see Appendix E), and a Leisure Activities 
Questionnaire (LAQ; see Appendix F).  The EDE was administered on the day of testing 
to confirm a BED diagnosis, or lack thereof, and to assess the key features of eating 
disorders (e.g., number of binge eating days and episodes, number of purging episodes, 
importance of shape or weight); a brief diagnostic version was used in order to minimize 
participant burden.  The EDE is a standardized, investigator-based interview with 
established reliability and validity (Fairburn & Cooper, 1993; Rizvi, Peterson, Crow, & 
Agras, 2000). 
 Eating disorder psychopathology was assessed by the EDE-Q, the self-report 
form of the EDE, which includes the subscales of Restraint, Eating Concern, Weight 
Concern, and Shape Concern (Black & Wilson, 1996; Fairburn & Beglin, 1994).  It has 
demonstrated good concurrent validity and acceptable criterion validity (Elder et al., 
2006; Mond, Hay, Rodgers, Owen, & Beumont, 2004). 
 The restraint scale of the DEBQ was administered to measure the cognitive 
aspects of dietary restraint (versus behavioral aspects) in order to assess whether 
dietary restraint was correlated with the discounting tasks.  The DEBQ has been referred 
to as the most “pure” of the available restraint scales because of its single-factor 
structure, high reliability and validity, and distinction from measurement of disinhibition, 
hunger, or weight fluctuation (Gorman & Allison, 1995).  A reliable and valid measure of 
behavioral dietary restriction has not been developed.  Thus, it has been suggested to 
measure dietary restriction by asking participants a single question of whether they are 
on a weight-loss diet (Lowe, 1993; Stice, Fisher, & Lowe, 2004).  Accordingly, one 
question was added to the DEBQ: “Have you been trying to eat less for at least three 
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months, for the purpose of losing weight?”  This question was used similarly to assess 
whether dieting was correlated with the participants’ degree of discounting. 
 A VAS assessing hunger was given to participants a few minutes before the 
discounting tasks, again, for the purpose of assessing whether hunger was correlated 
with the degree of discounting. This method, using anchoring points on a continuum to 
assess hunger, fullness, and desire for food (see Appendix D), has been shown to be a 
reliable and valid measure of appetite (Flint, Raben, Blundell, & Astrup, 2000; Mattes, 
Hollis, Hayes, & Stunkard, 2005; Williamson et al., 2006). 
 Finally, a SPM was administered in order to determine the participant’s highly 
desired snack foods to be used as the rewards in the discounting tasks.  The SPM was 
developed for this study and contains seven categories of snack foods (non-chocolate 
candy, candy bar, chips, cookies, popcorn, crackers/hard pretzels, nuts/seeds; see 
Appendix E) selected to represent foods most likely to be overeaten.  Likewise, the LAQ 
was administered in order to provide the participant’s highly desired sedentary activities 
to be used as the rewards in the discounting tasks.  The 12-item LAQ, developed for this 
study (see Appendix F), is very similar to methods used in other studies of sedentary 
activity (e.g., Epstein & Roemmich, 2001; Epstein, Saelens, Myers, & Vito, 1997).  
 In addition to the SPM and LAQ, participants were asked to provide the monetary 
value for their chosen rewards in order to determine whether the subjective value placed 
on rewards affects their degree of discounting.  For example, if a participant chose a 
candy bar as her favorite category of snack food and watching TV as her most preferred 
leisure activity, she was asked to assign a monetary value to the unit of food by the 
question, “What is the maximum amount you would pay for a (candy bar)?”  Likewise, 
she was asked to assign a monetary value to the leisure activity by the question, “What 
is the maximum amount you would pay to (watch TV)?”  
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 On the day of testing, before the discounting tasks were administered, 
participants completed the widely used Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  Earlier studies have shown that negative moods 
make it more likely that one will forego impulse control in favor of immediate gratification 
that will improve one’s mood (Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001); thus, this 
possibility also was assessed in this sample.  The 20-item PANAS has demonstrated 
high internal consistency, stability over two months, and convergent and discriminant 
validity (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
 In accordance with the third hypothesis of assessing the effect of comorbidity on 
the degree of discounting, and to determine study eligibility, participants completed two 
measures of general psychopathology.  The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis & 
Spencer, 1982) provided a continuous measure of psychological distress in which to 
examine the hypothesis.  The BSI has shown very good test-retest and internal 
consistency reliabilities, and good convergent and construct validity (Derogatis & 
Spencer, 1982).  The PRIME-MD Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ; Spitzer, Kroenke, 
& Williams, 1999) is a categorical measure that was used to determine final eligibility 
criterion.  The PHQ has shown good diagnostic validity, similar to the original PRIME-
MD, but can be administered in a shorter amount of time (Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 
1999). 
 A “filler” questionnaire, the brief Health Anxiety Inventory (Salkovskis, Rimes, 
Warwick, & Clark, 2002), was administered prior to the discounting tasks for the purpose 
of decreasing the likelihood that participants would deduce the purpose of the study, 
thus lessening possible demand characteristics.  The HAI was not analyzed.  See Table 
3 for a lay-out of the measures administered. 
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Table 3.  
Study Measures 
Domain Measures 
Demographic 
Information 
Age, education, income, race, marital status 
Impulsivity UPPS 
Barratt Impulsivity Scale-11 (BIS-11) 
Eating Diagnostic Eating Disorder Examination (EDE) 
Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q) 
Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire-Restraint (DEBQ-R) 
Visual Analogue Scale for hunger (VAS)  
Rewards Snack Preference Measure (SPM) 
Leisure Activity Questionnaire (LAQ) 
Monetary Value of Rewards 
 
Mood Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
General 
psychopathology 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ) 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
Filler Health Anxiety Inventory (HAI) 
Discounting Delay 
Probability 
Body Composition Height 
Weight 
            
Procedure 
 Once a participant met initial eligibility criteria over the phone, a 2-hour block of 
time was scheduled for the experiment at the university.  Upon arrival, written informed 
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consent was obtained from each participant after the study’s volunteer nature and 
procedures were reviewed to ensure comprehension.  Demographic information 
received previously was confirmed.  Weight then was assessed by a balance-beam 
scale, with participants in light clothing and no shoes, and height was assessed using a 
stadiometer.  BMI (kg/m2) was calculated from height (in meters) and weight (in 
kilograms) data.    
 Participants were administered the diagnostic version of the EDE to confirm that 
they met criteria for either the BED group, obese non-BED group, or control group.  If, at 
this point, it was determined that the participant was not eligible for the study, she 
received appropriate referrals.  If the participant was eligible, she continued in 
completing the PANAS, DEBQ-R, and VAS for hunger. 
 Participants then completed the discounting tasks in a private room.  The 
discounting tasks were administered on a computer monitor, with the type of reward 
(e.g., food, money) and type of discounting task (i.e., probability or delay) delivered in 
random order.  For the delay discounting task, participants were instructed that two 
amounts of hypothetical rewards would appear on the screen, and that they must 
choose between an amount they would receive immediately (e.g., $20 now) and another 
amount that would be received after a specified amount of time (e.g., $40 in  six 
months).  The instructions for the probability discounting task stated that one amount 
would definitely be received (e.g., 100% probability of receiving $50), whereas another 
amount would be received with a specified probability (e.g., 70% probability of receiving 
$100).  
 After completing the discounting tasks, the participant completed the 
questionnaires, then debriefed on the study and asked to sign a payment form.  
Participants were provided $30 in compensation for their participation and free group 
Behavioral Weight Loss (BWL) treatment.  The participant was provided with information 
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regarding the upcoming treatment.  The entire experimental session lasted 
approximately 1½ -2½ hours.  
 The weekly manualized group treatment began at a designated time after the 
experimental sessions were completed, and was conducted by two advanced clinical 
psychology doctoral students supervised by a licensed clinical psychologist.  Data were 
not collected from the participants at these sessions.  BWL has been found to be an 
effective treatment for obesity (Foster, Wadden, Kendall, Stunkard, & Vogt, 1996; 
Stunkard, 2000) and for binge eating (at least in the short-term; Marcus, Wing, & 
Fairburn, 1995).  The standardized published protocol was used for this treatment. 
STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
Data were double-entered and, unless otherwise noted, analyzed using SPSS 
version 13.0 or 14.0 for Windows.  Statistical significance for all tests was set at p < 
0.05. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Ninety participants completed the study.  In the self-report measures that were 
analyzed (BIS-11, BSI, DEBQ-R, EDEQ, PANAS, PHQ, UPPS, VAS), a minority of 
participants randomly missed answering <1% of all possible questions.  When dealing 
with missing data, it is suggested that the variable should be retained when missing data 
are not extensive (<10% of cases having missing data on a given variable); thus, it was 
decided to treat the missing data rather than delete these cases (Cohen & Cohen, 
1983).  Case mean substitution is a method that assigns the participant’s mean score of 
the present items, to the missing score (Raymond, 1986).  This technique is particularly 
appropriate for self-report measures where all items reflect a specific concept assumed 
to be closely correlated (Fox-Wasylyshyn & El-Masri, 2005).  Further, whereas multiple 
imputation is considered the most accurate imputation method, individual mean 
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imputations has been found to perform almost as well as, or slightly better than, multiple 
imputation in a questionnaire dataset (Shrive, Stuart, Quan, & Ghali, 2006).  In this 
dataset, the mean was calculated from a participant’s overall score when a single 
construct was assessed (e.g., depression from the BIS-11) or from the particular 
subscale in which the missing variable was located (e.g., one of the four subscales of 
the UPPS).  
Descriptive Analyses 
 Participants in the three different groups were compared on seven demographic 
variables (age, race, BMI, years of education, income range, marital status, and number 
of children).  For the continuous dependent variables of age, BMI, years of education, 
and number of children, nonparametric Kruskal-Wallace tests were performed to test 
group differences (Shapiro-Wilk normality tests, age: p < 0.05; all others, p < 0.01).   
Primary Analyses 
First Aim: To compare degree of discounting of delayed and probabilistic food, money, 
sedentary activity, and massage time as the rewards among women who are: (1) obese 
binge-eaters diagnosed with BED, (2) obese non-binge-eaters, and (3) normal-weight, 
non-binge-eaters.   
For both delay and probability discounting, the subjective value of each delayed 
or probabilistic reward for each participant, and the median of each of the groups, was 
plotted as a function of the delay until, or the odds against, receiving the reward.  
Equation 1 (for delay) and Equation 2 (for probability) then were fit to the data using 
nonlinear least-squares techniques for each reward type and amount to determine the 
parameters of the best-fitting discounting functions.   
Because of potential individual and group differences in the exponent (s) 
parameter of the hyperboloid equation, the discounting parameter (k and h) does not 
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necessarily, by itself, provide an independent measure of individual discounting.  
Individual parameter estimates for discounting functions also tend to be significantly 
positively skewed and thus, parametric statistical tests cannot be performed.  An 
alternative method of measuring discounting is to calculate the area under the empirical 
discounting curve (AUC) for each participant (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 
2001).  Area measures, normalized based on the maximum possible subjective values 
and the maximum delay or odds against studied, can range between 0.0 and 1.0, with 
smaller areas indicating steeper discounting (Myerson, Green, & Warusawitharana, 
2001).  Because the area is calculated from the empirical discounting function (i.e., the 
actual data points) rather than from a function fit to the data, the obtained area measure 
does not depend on any theoretical assumptions regarding the form of the discounting 
function.  In addition to being theoretically neutral, the AUC measure typically avoids the 
statistical problems created by skewed distributions because AUC is approximately 
normally distributed, and thus parametric statistical tests can be used to compare 
discounting data. 
AUC values were used as the basis for assessing differences in the degree of 
discounting among the groups, amounts, commodities, as well as their interactions.  
AUC scores were calculated for each participant and exhibited substantial skew.  
Because the skew reflected the nature of the processes being examined, its removal via 
transformation was not attempted (nor would it have been possible given the nature of 
the skew).  Rather, the skew was treated as the primary outcome of interest.  However, 
since no developed sampling theory exists for the comparison of skew in mixed designs 
such as this, randomization and bootstrapping techniques were used to test hypotheses. 
These techniques replace intractable or nonexistent theoretical sampling distributions 
with empirical sampling distributions.  Computer software to perform these analyses was 
written using Visual Basic, Version 5.0 (Microsoft, 1997). 
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Randomization and bootstrapping tests are both methods of resampling in which 
repeated samples are drawn from the obtained data in order to construct a sampling 
distribution for a statistic of interest.  Randomization techniques (also called permutation 
methods) randomly resample from the data without replacement to test null hypotheses, 
whereas bootstrap methods randomly resample from the data with replacement to 
establish confidence intervals around parameter estimates (Berger, 2006).  Both 
randomization and bootstrapping techniques were used with the present data in order to 
establish confidence in interpretation of the results, with significant results deduced only 
if the same conclusion was supported by the outcome of both techniques. 
In the randomization technique, between-group assignments are randomly 
shuffled, maintaining the same group sample sizes and, for each participant, the profile 
of repeated measures is randomly shuffled as well.  The logic behind this approach is 
that under the null hypothesis, the particular group label is meaningless as is the 
particular label attached to any particular measurement in the repeated measures 
profile.  Thus, a large collection of random shuffles of the data (2000 in this study) 
produces a sampling distribution for a statistic of interest under the null hypothesis.  In 
the current application, the skew was calculated within each condition after a particular 
random shuffle of the data and then contrasts corresponding to particular hypotheses 
were applied to the data.  Each contrast represented a linear combination of skew 
values, constructed to test main effects, interactions, or conceptually important 
comparisons.  The same contrasts were applied to the data as originally collected.  The 
location of the original data contrast in the empirical sampling distribution was then used 
to test the relevant hypotheses.  If the original data contrast fell in the lower or upper 
2.5% of the empirical sampling distribution, it constituted a rare event under the null 
hypothesis and thus the null was rejected.  The principal advantage of the randomization 
technique with the current data is that no theoretical sampling distribution is available for 
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comparing skew values.  An additional advantage is that no assumptions about the 
shape or nature of the sampling distribution need to be made (Berger, 2006).  
In the bootstrapping method, confidence intervals are estimated for the statistic 
of interest by randomly sampling with replacement from the observed scores to produce 
a new sample of the same size as the original sample; the skew is then calculated for 
each condition from this new sample and the contrasts applied to the skew values.  This 
process is repeated thousands of times in order to produce an empirical sampling 
distribution for each contrast.  The upper and lower confidence limits can then be 
established (Berger, 2006) and used for hypothesis testing by determining if the null 
hypothesis value is unusual (e.g., in the lower or upper 2.5% of the sampling 
distribution).  Bootstrap confidence intervals do not depend on normality and may avoid 
misleading inferences from being drawn (Carpenter & Bithell, 2000), but first they must 
be adjusted for bias that can exist if the central tendency of the distribution and the 
actual obtained value from the sample are different.  A variety of bias corrections have 
been proposed (Carpenter & Bithell, 2000; DiCiccio & Efron, 1996; Martin, 1990); for the 
current analyses, the bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals were used 
because this method has been thoroughly tested and performed as well as or better than 
other methods (Carpenter & Bithell, 2000; DiCiccio & Efron, 1996).  
For both randomization and bootstrapping, 2000 samples were randomly drawn 
for each of 33 hypotheses.  The 33 single-degree-of-freedom hypotheses involved group 
comparisons (e.g., Obese will be more skewed than Controls in delayed condition); 
reward comparisons (e.g., Food will be more skewed than money in the probability 
condition); and interactions of groups and rewards (e.g., Food will be more skewed than 
money; BED will be more skewed than Controls & Obese).  Verbal descriptions of the 
comparisons are presented in Table 11.  The actual contrasts consisted of weights used 
in the linear combination of skew values, with the weights normalized to have a sum of 
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squares equal to 1.00.  For example, Table 4 shows the contrast codes used to create 
the linear combination of skew values for testing the hypothesis that food will be more 
skewed than money in the delay condition.  Table 5 shows the contrast codes used to 
test the more complex hypothesis that food will be more skewed than money in the delay 
condition but that the degree of skew will be even greater for BED participants than for 
Controls and Obese (see Appendix G for the entire set of contrasts used).  
                                    
74 
 
                          
Table 4.   
Contrast Codes Used to Test the Hypothesis that Food will be more Skewed than Money in the Delay Condition.     
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.2887 0.2887 0 0 0 0 -
0.2887 
-
0.2887 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0.2887 0.2887 0 0 0 0 -
0.2887 
-
0.2887 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0.2887 0.2887 0 0 0 0 -
0.2887 
-
0.2887 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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        Table 5.   
        Contrast Codes Used to Test the Hypothesis that Food will be more Skewed than Money in the Delay Condition, especially for BED Compared to 
        Controls and Obese.                                                    
 Food 
sm 
delay 
Food 
lg 
delay 
Leisu
re 
sm  
delay 
Leisur
e  
lg  
delay 
Massag
e  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.408
2 
0.408
2 
0 0 0 0 -0.4082 -0.4082 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -
0.204
1 
-
0.204
1 
0 0 0 0 0.2041 0.2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese -
0.204
1 
-
0.204
1 
0 0 0 0 0.2041 0.2041 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
                                    
76 
 
In order to rule out an effect of participants’ subjective value of the rewards 
themselves on the rate in which they discounted the rewards, participants were asked 
the maximum amount they would pay for their chosen snack food item, and their chosen 
sedentary activity.  Rather than delete the one outlying answer ($500; 8.48 SDs from the 
mean), this answer was changed to the maximum value ($100) for the category in which 
it fell (chosen sedentary activity).  Partial correlations (controlling for income level and 
global psychopathology) were then conducted between the subjective value of the 
rewards and the AUC values.   
Second Aim: To determine whether severity of obesity and/or severity of binge eating 
were correlated with the participant’s degree of delay and probability discounting.  
 In order to determine whether participants’ severity of obesity (as judged by BMI 
on the day of testing) was correlated with the degree of delay and probability 
discounting, the degree of discounting (AUCs) of the small and large amounts were first 
averaged before conducting partial correlations between the BMI of the BED and Obese 
groups, and the degree of discounting (controlling for binge eating severity, dietary 
restraint, and overall psychopathology).  Similarly, BED participants’ severity of binge 
eating (as judged by the average weekly number of objective bulimic episodes over the 
past six months) was partially correlated (controlling for obesity, dietary restraint, and 
overall psychopathology) with averaged delay and averaged probability degree of 
discounting.  
Third Aim: To determine whether comorbid general psychopathology was correlated with 
the participant’s degree of delay and probability discounting. 
 The BSI, used to gauge participants’ level of psychopathology, produces the 
following scales: Global Severity Index (GSI), anxiety, depression, psychoticism, 
hostility, and somatization.  The scales’ T scores were partially correlated (controlling for 
BMI and positive and negative mood) with the participants’ averaged delay and 
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averaged probability degree of discounting.  In addition, since the BSI does not measure 
alcohol use, the index score of “preliminary alcohol abuse diagnosis” from the PHQ also 
was partially correlated with participants’ averaged delay and averaged probability 
degree of discounting. 
 Since mood, hunger, restraint over eating, and dieting all may influence one’s 
food choices, participants completed the PANAS (mood at the moment), VAS (hunger at 
the moment), DEBQ-R (restraint over eating), and the extra dieting question added to 
the DEBQ-R, before completing the discounting tasks.  Partial correlations were 
conducted to determine whether any of these measures were associated with the 
degree of discounting.  Participants’ averaged delay and averaged probability degree of 
discounting were partially correlated with both scales of the PANAS (positive and 
negative mood at the moment; controlling for hunger, depression T scores, and anxiety 
T scores), the summed hunger rating of the VAS (hunger at the moment; controlling for 
negative mood, dieting, and restraint), the mean of the DEBQ-R (restraint over eating; 
controlling for hunger and dieting), and the extra dieting question added to the DEBQ-R 
(current dieting status; controlling for hunger and restraint).    
Fourth Aim: To explore convergent and discriminative validity of impulsivity assessments 
by comparing questionnaire measures of self-control and impulsivity to the behavioral 
discounting computerized measures.  
 In order to explore the convergent and discriminative validity of impulsivity 
assessments, the averaged delay and averaged probability degree of discounting were 
partially correlated with the UPPS measure (comprised of the subscales Lack of 
Premeditation, Urgency, Sensation Seeking, and Lack of Perseverance) and the BIS-11 
(comprised of the subscales Attentional Impulsivity, Motor Impulsivity, and Nonplanning 
Impulsivity), controlling for negative mood, binge eating severity, BMI, and overall 
psychopathology.  Higher scores on the impulsivity questionnaires indicate more 
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impulsivity, whereas lower scores on discounting (less area under the curve) indicate 
more impulsive decision-making. 
Fifth Aim: To evaluate the magnitude effect, determine if the magnitude effect was 
observed with different types of non-monetary rewards, and within these participant 
groups.  
 Shapiro-Wilk normality tests indicated that of the 16 AUC variables in the full 
sample, only the probabilistic reward of sedentary activity in the small amount was 
normally distributed.  Because of this, the nonparametric Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests 
were used to test the magnitude effect with both the full sample and within the three 
groups.  
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analyses 
 For the continuous dependent variables of age, BMI, years of education, and 
number of children, there were no statistically significant differences among the groups, 
with, of course, the exception of BMI (p < 0.001; see Table 6).  Participants were, on 
average, 47.38 years old (SD = 10.77). The majority of women self-identified as White 
(77.8%; n = 70), with the remainder of women identifying as Black (18.9%; n = 17), 
Hispanic (2.2%; n = 2), and Asian (1.1%; n = 1).  According to self-report, 72.2% (n = 65) 
of the participants had at least one child (M = 1.56, SD = 1.37) and were highly 
educated: 8.9% (n = 8) reported completing or attending some high school; 28.9% (n = 
26) reported completing some college/technical school; 30% (n = 27) reported 
graduating college; 10% (n = 9) reported completing some graduate school; and 22.2% 
(n = 20) reported earning a graduate/professional degree (M = 15.56, SD = 2.05).  Their 
annual income level was high: 33.3% under $40K (n = 30), 33.3% $40-80K (n = 30), and 
32.2% $80 to over-100K (n = 29; 1 participant refused to answer).  A majority of the 
sample was currently married: 22% had never married (n = 20), 42.2% were married (n 
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= 38), 18.9% were divorced (n = 17), 13.3% were divorced and remarried (n = 12), and 
3.3% were widowed (n = 3).  
 
Table 6.  
Sample characteristics: Continuous Variables 
 Mean + SD 
Participant variable Controls    
n  = 30 
Obese    
n = 30 
BED    
n = 30 
FULL SAMPLE  
N = 90 
Age 43.83 (12.38) 48.83 (9.56) 49.47 (9.58) 47.38 (10.77) 
BMI (kg/m2) 23.28 (2.38)a 42.60 (7.80)b 42.03 (9.79)b 35.97 (11.59) 
Years of Education 15.73 (2.15) 15.73 (1.98) 15.20 (2.02) 15.56 (2.05) 
Number of 
Children 
1.10   (1.24) 1.80   (1.47) 1.77   (1.31) 1.56   (1.37) 
Note. Differing letters indicate significant differences, p < 0.001 
 
 Participants’ BMIs ranged from 18.00 to 70.00 kg/m2 (M = 35.97, SD = 11.59).  
Evidence-based guidelines state that overweight ranges from a BMI of 25 to 29.9, 
obesity is defined as a BMI > 30, severe obesity is defined as a BMI > 35, and morbid 
obesity is defined as a BMI > 40 (National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, 1998).  Thus, 
the obese groups’ average BMI of 42.32 (SD = 8.78) is classified as morbidly obese.  
Follow-up Mann-Whitney tests found that, per the study inclusion criteria, the BMI values 
of the Obese and BED groups did not significantly differ (p > 0.05), but the BMI values 
between the Control and BED group, and the Control and Obese group, were 
significantly different (ps < 0.001).  For the three demographic categorical variables of 
race, income range, and marital status, Chi-square tests revealed no significant 
differences among the groups (see Table 7; all ps > .05).  
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Table 7.  
Sample Characteristics: Categorical Variables 
 Frequencies (Percentage of Full Sample) 
Participant variable Controls    
n  = 30 
Obese    
n = 30 
BED    
n = 30 
FULL SAMPLE  
N = 90 
Race     
     White 24    (80%) 21    (70%) 25 (83.3%) 70 (77.8%) 
      Black   4 (13.3%)   9    (30%)   4 (13.3%) 17 (18.9%) 
      Hispanic   1   (3.3%)    0   (0.0%)   1   (3.3%)   2 (2.2%) 
      Asian   1   (3.3%)   0   (0.0%)   0   (0.0%)   1 (1.1%) 
Income*     
     <$40K 12    (40%)   7 (23.3%) 11 (36.7%) 30 (33.3%) 
       $40-80K   7 (23.3%) 14 (46.7%)   9    (30%) 30 (33.3%) 
       $80 to over 100K 10 (33.3%)   9    (30%) 10 (33.3%) 29 (32.2%) 
Marital Status     
      Never married   7 (23.3%)   6   (2.0%)   7 (23.3%) 20 (22.2%) 
      Married once 12    (40%) 16 (53.3%) 10 (33.3%) 38 (42.2%) 
      Divorced   3   (1.0%)   4 (13.3%) 10 (33.3%) 17 (18.9%) 
      Divorced, remarried   7 (23.3%)   2   (6.7%)   3   (1.0%) 12 (13.3%) 
      Widowed   1   (3.3%)   2   (6.7%)   0   (0.0%)   3   (3.3%) 
* 1 control participant chose not to answer 
Discounting Functions 
Delay Discounting 
Figures 6 and 7 show the median subjective value of each delayed reward. 
Figure 6 shows these values for the small amount, and Figure 7 shows these values for 
the large amount.  Each figure is composed of four panels, each representing the results 
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for a different reward.  The symbols represent the subjective value of the delayed 
rewards by group, plotted as a function of the delay until receipt of the reward.  The 
parameter values from the delay discounting data are shown in Table 8, which 
demonstrates that the data are well-described by Equation 1; the mean R2 for the delay 
discounting curves is 0.95, and all R2 values are larger than 0.84. 
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Figure 6 
Plots of median subjective values: Delayed small amount  
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Figure 7 
Plots of median subjective values: Delayed large amount  
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 Table 8.  
 Delay Discounting Parameters 
 BED   Obese   Control   
Small 
Amount 
k s R2 k s R2 k s R2 
Food 28.00 0.86 0.94 14.80 0.50 0.99 2.96 0.80 0.98 
Sedentary 
Activity 
15.97 0.43 0.99 47.98 0.26 0.98 56.57 0.27 0.87 
Massage 28.80 0.37 0.90 51.66 0.24 0.88 11.54 0.35 0.90 
Money 0.31 0.83 0.98 0.53 0.44 0.98 0.07 1.22 0.95 
Large 
Amount 
         
Food 274.42 0.54 0.99 32.36 0.47 0.94 5.95 0.79 0.99 
Sedentary 
Activity 
24.68 0.47 0.98 43.03 0.32 0.91 43.83 0.37 0.99 
Massage 14.26 0.56 0.96 432790.24 0.11 0.84 9.47 0.43 0.96 
Money 0.40 0.52 0.99 0.35 0.52 0.97 0.06 1.31 0.99 
 
Probability Discounting 
Figures 8 and 9 show the median subjective value of each probabilistic reward. 
Figure 8 shows these values for the small amount, and Figure 9 shows these values for 
the large amount.  Each figure is composed of four panels, each representing the results 
for a different reward.  The symbols represent the subjective value of the probabilistic 
reward by group, plotted as a function of the odds against receipt of the reward.  The 
parameter values from the probability discounting data are shown in Table 9, which 
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demonstrates that the data are well-described by Equation 2; the mean R2 for the 
probability discounting curves is 0.95, and all R2 values are larger than 0.81. 
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Figure 8 
Plots of median subjective values: Probabilistic small amount  
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Figure 9 
Plots of median subjective values: Probabilistic large amount  
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 Table 9.  
 Probability Discounting Parameters 
 BED   Obese   Control   
Small 
Amount 
h s R2 h s R2 h s R2 
Food 131.05 0.50 0.97 46.76 0.46 0.93 975.66 0.28 0.86 
Sedentary 
Activity 
17.73 0.51 0.99 55.74 0.24 0.94 92.69 0.25 0.99 
Massage 40.65 0.44 0.94 186.62 0.22 0.95 37.90 0.29 0.99 
Money 5.25 0.73 0.98 22.60 0.30 0.97 10.30 0.40 0.95 
Large 
Amount 
         
Food 199.01 0.51 0.81 618.59 0.37 0.94 33.98 0.64 0.99 
Sedentary 
Activity 
13.76 0.79 0.99 112.22 0.31 0.86 43.48 0.40 0.99 
Massage 12.08 0.89 0.95 185.37 0.31 0.94 63.55 0.41 0.97 
Money 22.38 0.45 0.88 13.00 0.48 0.98 5.74 0.63 0.98 
 
 Figure 10 presents box plots of the AUC values for the delayed rewards, 
averaged across the two amounts, for the control, obese and BED groups.  Each panel 
represents the results for a different type of delayed reward.  The bottom and top of each 
box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively, and the horizontal line within 
each box represents the group median (50th percentile). The vertical lines (“whiskers”) 
extending from the boxes represent the minimum and maximum values that are not 
outliers, and outliers are represented by the points at the end of these lines.  Outliers are 
defined as values above the 90th percentile, or below the 10th percentile.  Positive 
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skewness is indicated by a box that extends higher above the median line than it does 
below, and a top whisker that is longer than the bottom whisker.  The box plots show the 
consistency with which the BED group had lower AUC medians (i.e., greater delay 
discounting) and greater skew than the Obese and Control groups. 
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Box plots of the AUC values for delayed rewards 
                                    
91 
 
Figure 11 presents box plots of the AUC values for the probabilistic rewards, 
averaged across the two amounts, for the control, obese and BED groups.  Each panel 
represents the results for a different type of probabilistic reward.  The box plots show 
that, as was true for delayed rewards, the BED group consistently had lower AUC 
medians (i.e., greater probability discounting) and greater skew than the Obese and 
Control groups. 
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Figure 11 
Box plots of the AUC values for probabilistic rewards 
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Primary Analyses 
First Aim: To compare degree of discounting of delayed and probabilistic food, money, 
sedentary activity, and massage time as the rewards among women who are: (1) obese 
binge-eaters diagnosed with BED, (2) obese non-binge-eaters, and (3) normal-weight, 
non-binge-eaters.   
When examining the relations between participants’ subjective appraisal of the 
monetary values of the snack food and sedentary activity with the averaged delay and 
averaged probability degree of discounting, no significant correlations were found 
between the subjective monetary values of food and sedentary activity, and the AUC 
values regarding food and sedentary activity.   
The AUC data were heavily and positively skewed across the full sample.  Skew 
is most easily interpreted by its z-score, with a value ≥ 1.96 revealing a significant 
departure from normal, rendering data interpretation and parametric analyses 
problematic (Field, 2003).  The average skew z-score for the averaged (between small 
and large amounts) delay and probability AUC values was 5.17, indicating significant 
and substantial departure from normal.  Only the delayed reward of money was normally 
distributed, with a skew z-score of 0.686.  Table 10 and Figure 12 show that skew varied 
considerably among groups, with the BED group appearing the most skewed as 
compared to the Obese and Control groups.  Indeed, Table 10 reveals that the BED 
group is more positively skewed (indicating a left-stacked distribution, corresponding to 
smaller AUC values and more impulsive decision-making) in each of the eight 
discounting categories, averaged between small and large amounts.  Figure 12 
illustrates the number of participants by group who discounted delayed sedentary activity 
in various degrees, with the BED group showing the most participants who discounted 
sedentary activity steeply (smaller AUC values).  Despite these visual depictions of the 
data, however, standard nonparametric tests to compare medians could not capture 
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these apparent group differences.  Thus, it appeared that a more sensitive approach 
would be a nonparametric test to compare skewness.  Because there is no theoretical 
sampling distribution for comparisons involving skew, the resampling methods of 
bootstrapping and randomization tests emerged as the best candidates for testing the 
hypotheses.  Nonstandardized skew differences for the 33 one-way hypotheses are 
reported below in Table 11, followed by the mean skew corresponding to the significant 
main effects in Table 12.  An example of the empirical sampling distribution that results 
from the bootstrapping approach is shown in Figure 13 for the hypothesis that BED 
participants will demonstrate more skew than Controls and Obese in the Delay 
Condition.  The sampling distribution for the randomization test of the same hypothesis 
is shown in Figure 14.  Both Figures 13 and 14 depict the frequency distribution of the 
data, containing 2000 individual contrast values generated for either the bootstrap or 
randomization analysis for that particular hypothesis.  Each figure shows the distribution 
of the 2000 estimates, one from each sample. 
          Table 10.  
Averaged (between Small and Large) AUC Skewness by Group 
DELAYED REWARD SKEW Z-SCORE 
Food   
                BED 5.36 
                Obese 3.18 
                Control 2.49 
Sedentary Activity   
                BED 3.42 
                Obese 1.84 
                Control 1.23 
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DELAYED REWARD SKEW Z-SCORE 
Massage   
                BED 4.47 
                Obese 1.44 
                Control 2.78 
Money   
                BED 0.79 
                Obese 0.06 
                Control 0.55 
PROBABILISTIC REWARD   
Food   
                BED 4.14 
                Obese 3.72 
                Control 2.43 
Sedentary Activity   
                BED 3.69 
                Obese 2.17 
                Control 0.28 
Massage   
                BED 6.27 
                Obese 1.29 
                Control 2.83 
Money   
                BED 4.57 
                Obese 2.29 
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DELAYED REWARD SKEW Z-SCORE 
                Control 0.44 
 
Figure 12.  
Skewness of delayed sedentary activity AUC values by group 
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Figure 13.  
Frequency distribution of bootstrap contrast values for the hypothesis: Delayed 
discounting of food will be more skewed than delayed discounting of money 
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Figure 14.  
Frequency distribution of randomization contrast values for the hypothesis: Delayed 
discounting of food will be more skewed than delayed discounting of money 
 
Table 11.  
 Nonstandardized Skew Differences for 33 Discounting Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
 Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
Level 
 
Delay Discounting 
Food will be more skewed than money   1.57 3.62 p <0.005 <0.0001  
Randomization Test Contrast Values 
1.881.631.381.13
.88.63.38.13 -.13-.38-.63-.88-1.13-1.38 -1.63-1.88
 
 
300 
200 
100 
0
Std. Dev = .57  
Mean = .03
N = 2000.00 
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Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
Level 
 
Delay Discounting 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity 
 -0.24  1.93 n.s. 0.0475 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money 
  1.43  3.09 p <0.005 <0.0001 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
  0.46 4.05 p <0.005 0.0025 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls  -1.22  1.15 n.s. 0.8250 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
 -0.10 2.33 p = 0.05 0.0255 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls  
 -0.52  1.19 n.s. 0.2545 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -0.83  1.55 n.s. 0.2805 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls 
 -0.38  1.55 n.s. 0.1380 
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Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
Level 
 
Delay Discounting 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -0.11 2.01 p = 0.05 0.0540 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls  
 -0.74  0.54 n.s. 0.7560 
Probability Discounting 
Food will be more skewed than money  -0.34  1.97 n.s. 0.0115 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity  
 -0.37  2.08 n.s. 0.0100 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money 
 -0.86  1.56 n.s. 0.3755 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
  1.05 4.93 p <0.005 <0.0001 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls  -0.71  1.92 n.s. 0.1180 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
 -1.94  0.62 n.s. 0.1220 
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Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
level 
 
Probability Discounting 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls 
 -1.43  0.62 n.s. 0.3685 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -2.06  0.59 n.s. 0.0795 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls 
 -1.19  1.21 n.s. 0.4295 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -1.02  1.07 n.s. 0.9980 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls 
 -1.75  0.66 n.s. 0.2285 
Interactions (Delay vs. Probability) 
Food will be more skewed than money   0.22 2.18 p = 0.01 0.0075 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity 
 -1.00  1.11 n.s. 0.7130 
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Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
Level 
 
Interactions (Delay vs. Probability) 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money 
  0.39 2.33 p <0.005 0.0015 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
 -3.24  0.41 n.s. 0.0540 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls  -1.42  0.47 n.s. 0.1600 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
BED will be more skewed than Controls & 
Obese 
  0.03  2.41 p <0.05 0.0110 
Food will be more skewed than money; 
Obese will be more skewed than Controls 
 -0.35  1.35 n.s. 0.1360 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -0.46  1.96 n.s. 0.0495 
Food will be more skewed than massage 
& sedentary activity; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls 
 -0.62  1.30 n.s. 0.2600 
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Hypothesis Bias Corrected & 
Accelerated Bootstrap 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
Randomization 
Test Probability 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Significance 
Level 
 
Interactions (Delay vs. Probability) 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; BED will be more 
skewed than Controls & Obese 
 -0.46  1.55 n.s. 0.1315 
Massage & sedentary activity will be more 
skewed than money; Obese will be more 
skewed than Controls 
 -0.59  1.19 n.s. 0.2575 
n.s. = not significant            
          Table 12.  
          Mean Skews Corresponding to Significant Main Effects 
Hypothesis Reward Mean Skew z-
score 
Delay Discounting 
Food will be more skewed than 
money 
Food 5.480 
 Money 0.686 
Massage & sedentary activity 
will be more skewed than 
money 
Massage 4.442 
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Hypothesis Reward Mean Skew z-
score 
Delay Discounting 
 Sedentary 
Activity 
5.461 
 Money 0.686 
 
Group 
 
BED will be more skewed than 
Controls & Obese 
BED 2.580 
 Obese 1.710 
 Controls 1.059 
Probability Discounting 
BED will be more skewed than 
Controls & Obese 
BED 2.946 
 Obese 0.885 
 Controls 0.689 
 
For discounting of delayed rewards, all groups discounted food, sedentary 
activity, and massage time significantly more steeply than money (p < 0.005).  For 
probability discounting, no discounting differences were found among rewards, although 
there was a trend towards food being discounted more steeply than money, sedentary 
activity, and massage time.  With all rewards combined, BED participants differed 
significantly from obese and control participants in both delay (p < 0.005) and probability 
discounting (p < 0.005).  For delay discounting, BED participants discounted food 
significantly more steeply than money to a greater degree than obese and control 
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participants discounted food more steeply than money (p < 0.05).  Further, for delay 
discounting, BED participants discounted massage and sedentary activity significantly 
more steeply than money to a greater degree than obese and control participants 
discounted these rewards, at a trend level (p = 0.05).  Obese participants did not differ 
from control participants in their discounting of delayed or probabilistic rewards.  
Second Aim: To determine whether severity of obesity (as measured by BMI) and/or 
severity of binge eating (as measured by number of objectively large binges per week) 
are correlated with the participants’ degree of delay and probability discounting.  
 Partial correlations (controlling for dietary restraint, binge severity, and overall 
psychopathology) revealed no significant correlations between levels of obesity (as 
measured by BMI) and the degree of discounting of the two obese groups (all ps > 0.05). 
However, BMI was negatively correlated with discounting of delayed food at a trend level 
(r = -0.222, p = 0.053).  Similarly, BED participants’ severity of binge eating (measured 
by average weekly number of objective bulimic episodes over the past six months) was 
not significantly partially correlated (controlling for dietary restraint, BMI, and overall 
psychopathology) with any degrees of discounting (all ps > 0.05).  See Table 13 for more 
details.  Exploratory analyses of the partial correlations between severity of binge eating 
and the impulsivity questionnaires (BIS-11, UPPS; controlling for BMI and overall 
psychopathology) revealed significant negative correlations of binge eating with the total 
BIS-11 score (r = -0.356, p < 0.05), the BIS-11 subscale Attentional Impulsivity (r = -
0.374, p < 0.05), and the UPPS subscale Lack of Perseverance (r = -.319, p < 0.05).    
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      Table 13.  
      Partial Correlations of BMI, OBEs, and Averaged (between Small and  
      Large) AUC Measures of Discounting* 
 BMI a OBEb 
Delayed Reward 
  Food -0.222  0.015 
  Sedentary Activity -0.115  0.115 
  Massage   0.085 -0.011 
  Money -0.207  0.154 
Probabilistic Reward 
  Food -0.073 -0.161 
  Sedentary Activity -0.189 -0.252 
  Massage  0.025 -0.002 
  Money -0.107 -0.155 
* Smaller AUC values indicate steeper discounting, thus a negative correlation indicates  
    steeper discounting is associated with higher values of the correlated variable 
a
   Controlling for dietary restraint, overall psychopathology, OBEs 
b
   Controlling for dietary restraint, overall psychopathology, BMI 
 
Third Aim: To determine whether comorbid general psychopathology is correlated with 
participants’ degree of delay and probability discounting. 
 Overall psychopathology (GSI) and the other BSI scales were negatively 
correlated with participants’ degree of delay discounting; however, they were not as 
significantly correlated with the degree of probabilistic discounting.  See Table 14 for a 
layout of the correlations. 
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 Since mood, hunger, restraint over eating, and dieting all may influence one’s 
food choices, partial correlations were conducted to determine if the PANAS (mood at 
the moment), VAS (hunger at the moment), DEBQ-R (restraint over eating), and the 
extra dieting question added to the DEBQ-R (current dieting status) were partially 
correlated with the averaged (between small and large) degree of discounting.  The 
PANAS positive mood scale was negatively correlated with the averaged degree of 
discounting of delayed massage (r = -0.230, p < 0.05) when controlling for hunger, 
depression T scores, and anxiety T scores.  The PANAS negative mood scale was 
positively correlated with the degree of discounting of sedentary activity (r = 0.215, p < 
0.05), delayed food at a trend level (r = 0.211, p = 0.054), and probabilistic food (r = 
0.289, p < 0.01).  The VAS hunger scale (controlling for negative mood, dieting, and 
restraint), DEBQ-R (controlling for hunger and dieting), and the dieting question 
(controlling for hunger and restraint) were not significantly correlated with any of the 
degrees of discounting.  
Table 14.  
Partial Correlationsa of BSI Psychopathology T scores and Averaged (between Small and Large) AUC 
Measures of Discountingb 
 Global 
Severity 
Index  
Anxiety Depression Psychoticism Hostility Somatization Alcohol 
Abuse 
Dxc 
Delayed Reward 
  Food -0.351** -0.368** -0.331** -0.310** -0.259** -0.190* 0.031 
  Sedentary        
  Activity 
-0.378** -0.353** -0.379** -0.380** -0.275** -0.197* 0.063 
  Massage -0.309** -0.206* -0.275** -0.315** -0.189* -0.139 0.096 
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 Global 
Severity 
Index  
Anxiety Depression Psychoticism Hostility Somatization Alcohol 
Abuse 
Dxc 
Delayed Reward 
  Money -0.288** -0.228* -0.232* -0.220* -0.219* -0.210* -0.021 
Probabilistic Reward 
  Food -0.241* -0.279** -0.173 -0.177 -0.250* -0.181 0.062 
  Sedentary  
  Activity 
-0.240* -0.283** -0.216* -0.180 -0.247* -0.149 0.211* 
  Massage -0.232* -0.139 -0.154 -0.172 -0.128 -0.211* 0.276** 
  Money -0.105 -0.053 -0.052 0.028 -0.127 -0.181 0.028 
a
   Controlling for PANAS scales, BMI, and group 
b
   Smaller AUC values indicate steeper discounting, thus a negative correlation indicates steeper discounting is 
associated with higher values of the correlated variable 
c
  Item taken from the PHQ 
*   p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
Fourth Aim: To explore convergent and discriminative validity of impulsivity assessments 
by comparing questionnaire measures of self-control and impulsivity to the behavioral 
discounting computerized measures.  
 The results revealed significant positive correlations among three of the four 
UPPS subscales (Lack of Premeditation, Urgency, and Lack of Perseverance) and the 
BIS-11 total score and subscales (see Table 15).   
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Table 15.  
Partial Correlations a of UPPS and BIS-11 Scales 
 (Lack of) 
Premeditation 
Urgency Sensation 
Seeking 
(Lack of) 
Perseverance 
Total BIS  0.325**  0.203* 0.037 0.241** 
   Attentional Impulsivity  0.080  0.019 0.090 0.183* 
   Motor Impulsivity  0.212*  0.100 0.084 0.015 
   Nonplanning Impulsivity  0.408** 0.309** -0.072 0.338** 
a
   Controlling for PANAS negative scale, BMI, overall psychopathology, binge frequency, & group 
*   p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
  
However, the BIS-11 revealed very few significant correlations with the averaged 
degree of delay discounting and averaged degree of probability discounting, with only 
one negative correlation between the BIS-11 Total and Nonplanning Impulsivity with the 
degree of discounting of averaged delayed money (p < 0.05).  None of the UPPS 
subscales was significantly correlated with the degree of discounting of the averaged 
delayed rewards (all ps > 0.05), and only two of the four subscales were significantly 
correlated with the averaged probabilistic rewards, but in a positive direction.  The 
subscale Lack of Premeditation was significantly positively correlated with the averaged 
probabilistic reward of sedentary activity (r = 0.216, p < 0.05), and Urgency was 
significantly positively correlated with the averaged probabilistic rewards of food (r = 
0.275, p < 0.01), sedentary activity (r = 0.272, p < 0.01), and money (r = 0.211, p < 
0.05).  See Table 16 for more details. 
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            Table 16.  
            Partial Correlationsa of Impulsivity Questionnaires and AUC Measures of Discountingb 
 BIS-11 UPPS 
 Total Attentional 
Impulsivity 
Motor 
Impulsivity 
Nonplanning  
Impulsivity 
(Lack of) 
Premeditation 
Urgency Sensation 
Seeking 
(Lack of) 
Perseverance 
Delayed Reward 
  Food -0.010 -0.015  0.080 -0.080  0.060  0.165 -0.021  0.071 
  Sedentary   
  Activity 
 0.123  0.054  0.177  0.048  0.102  0.045 -0.128 -0.019 
  Massage -0.145 -0.153 -0.082 -0.101  0.121 -0.073  0.149 -0.123 
  Money -
0.189* 
 0.021 -0.157 -0.257* -0.044  0.111 -0.047  0.035 
Probabilistic Reward 
  Food  0.053 -0.049  0.143  0.016  0.178* 0.275** -0.020  0.174 
  Sedentary 
  Activity 
 0.126  0.004  0.126  0.138  0.216* 0.272** -0.156  0.083 
  Massage -0.008 -0.100  0.112 -0.039  0.057 0.012  0.048 -0.070 
  Money  0.129  0.121  0.169  0.016  0.175 0.211*  0.013  0.143 
                     a
   Controlling for PANAS negative scale, BMI, overall psychopathology, binge frequency, & group 
                     b     Smaller AUC values indicate steeper discounting, thus a negative correlation indicates steeper discounting is 
associated with higher values of the correlated variable 
              *   p < 0.05 
              ** p < 0.01 
 
Fifth Aim: To evaluate the magnitude effect, determine if the magnitude effect is 
observed with different types of non-monetary rewards, and within the participant 
groups.  
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 Results indicated that the magnitude effect, namely that larger delayed amounts 
are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed amounts, was found with money.  The 
$100 delayed reward was discounted significantly less steeply than the $40 delayed 
amount (p < 0.01).  For the non-monetary delayed rewards of sedentary activity and 
massage, however, the larger amount was discounted more steeply than the smaller 
amount (sedentary activity, p < 0.001; massage, p < 0.01).  There was no effect of 
amount on the discounting of delayed food (p > 0.05).   
The magnitude effect with probabilistic rewards is opposite of that with delayed 
rewards.  That is, larger probabilistic rewards are discounted more steeply than smaller 
probabilistic rewards.  For all probabilistic rewards, the larger amount was discounted 
more steeply than the smaller amount (all ps < 0.001).   
In examining the magnitude effect by group, overall patterns were similar to the 
results from the full sample.  Differences among the groups were as follows: (1) the 
Control group was the only group for whom there was a significant magnitude effect for 
delayed money (p < 0.05); (2) the Obese group was the only group for whom there was 
not a significant magnitude effect for probabilistic food (p > 0.05); and (3) the Control 
group was the only group for whom there was not a significant magnitude effect for 
delayed massage (p > 0.05).  Detailed results can be found in Table 17. 
Table 17.  
Magnitude Effects of Full Sample and by Group: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test z-scores 
Full Sample 
Delayed 
Reward 
Magnitude effect: 
Large amount discounted less 
steeply than small amount 
   
Small amount discounted less 
steeply than large amount 
 
No effect of amount 
   Food   -0.404 
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Full Sample 
Delayed 
Reward 
Magnitude effect: 
Large amount discounted less 
steeply than small amount 
 
Small amount discounted less 
steeply than large amount 
 
No effect of amount 
   Sedentary  
   Activity    
 
-4.514*** 
 
   Massage  -3.294**  
   Money -2.892**   
Probabilistic 
Reward 
 
Large amount discounted less 
steeply than small amount 
Magnitude effect: 
Small amount discounted less 
steeply than large amount 
 
   Food  -3.563***  
   Sedentary  
   Activity    
 
-6.061*** 
 
   Massage  -7.171***  
   Money  -6.085***  
By Group 
 Controls Obese BED 
 Magnitude 
effect 
  
Magnitude 
effect 
  
Magnitude 
effect 
  
 
 
Delayed 
Reward 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
   Food   -0.852   -1.477   -0.165 
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Controls Obese BED 
 
Magnitude 
Effect 
 
 
Magnitude 
Effect 
 
 
Magnitude 
Effect 
 
 
 
Delayed 
Reward 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
   Sedentary  
   Activity     
 
-3.676*** 
  
-2.022* 
  
-2.095* 
 
   Massage   -1.753  -2.130*   -2.274*  
   Money -2.065*     -1.157   -1.870 
 
 
Magnitude 
effect 
  
Magnitude 
effect 
  
Magnitude 
effect 
 
Probabilistic 
Reward 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
amount 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg 
amount 
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
amount 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg 
amount  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
Lg amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply 
than sm 
amount 
Sm amt 
discounted 
less  
steeply  
than lg 
amount  
No 
effect 
of 
amount 
   Food  -3.057**    -0.569  -2.619**  
   Sedentary  
   Activity     
 
-4.271*** 
  
-3.471** 
  
-2.755** 
 
   Massage  -4.271***   -4.033***   -4.203***  
   Money  -3.074**   -3.917***   -3.296**  
*   p < 0.05    
**  p < 0.01  
*** p < 0.001  
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Exploratory Analyses 
As an extension of this study’s first aim (group differences in discounting) and 
fourth aim (convergent, discriminant validity of impulsivity measures), between-group 
differences of responses on the impulsivity questionnaires BIS-11 and UPPS were 
assessed by conducting a MANCOVA with group as the between-subject variable.  The 
total score of the BIS-11, three BIS-11 subscales (Attentional Impulsivity, Motor 
Impulsivity, and Nonplanning Impulsivity), and four subscales of the UPPS (Lack of 
Premeditation, Urgency, Sensation Seeking, and Lack of Perseverance) were entered 
along with the covariates of participant age, education, and overall psychopathology.  A 
significant group effect was found, F = 2.05, p = 0.017 (Pillai’s Trace), indicating that the 
groups differed significantly on the combined set of impulsivity subscales.   
Only the between-groups effects for Urgency, F(2, 82) = 8.70, p < 0.0001 was 
significant, with Lack of Perseverance at a trend level, F(2, 82) = 2.79, p = 0.068.  Planned 
contrasts revealed that the BED group reported significantly higher (p < 0.05) Urgency 
(M = 3.01 on a 4-point scale) than the Obese (M = 2.45) and Control groups (M = 2.21). 
Further, the BED group reported significantly higher (p < 0.05) Lack of Perseverance (M 
= 2.13 on a 4-point scale) than the Control group (M = 1.77). 
Further analyses were conducted as an extension of the third aim, to determine 
whether comorbid general psychopathology was correlated with participants’ degree of 
delay and probability discounting.  Even though the analyses of the third aim controlled 
for group, exploratory correlational analyses by group revealed that the significant 
relationships seen in Table 12 were due mostly to the significant relationships between 
the degree of discounting and psychopathology within the BED group.  That is, within the 
Control group no significant correlations were seen between psychopathology and the 
degree of discounting, while in the Obese group only two significant correlations, 
between depression and the averaged delayed reward of food (r = -0.477; p < 0.01), and 
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between psychoticism and the averaged delayed reward of food (r = -0.336, p < 0.05) 
were observed.  In the BED group, however, many significant correlations emerged, as 
shown in Table 18. 
Table 18.  
BED Group Only: Partial Correlationsa of BSI Psychopathology T scores and Averaged (between 
Small and Large) AUC Measures of Discountingb  
 Global 
Severity 
Index  
Anxiety Depression Psychoticism Hostility Somatization Alcohol 
Abuse 
Dxc 
Delayed Reward 
  Food -0.424* -0.485** -0.337 -0.391* -0.334 -0.254 -0.086 
  Sedentary    
  Activity 
-0.489** -0.493** -0.496** -0.473* -0.366* -0.312 -0.121 
  Massage -0.543** -0.350 -0.397* -0.539** -0.355* -0.381* -0.219 
  Money -0.405* -0.330 -0.329 -0.336 -0.389* -0.228 -0.387 
Probabilistic Reward 
  Food -0.315 -0.459* -0.222 -0.263 -0.337 -0.147 -0.095 
  Sedentary   
  Activity 
-0.331 -0.418* -0.378* -0.331 -0.310 -0.211 -0.019 
  Massage -0.206 -0.095 -0.124 -0.076 -0.069 -0.213  0.129 
  Money -0.102 -0.090 -0.054  0.042 -0.123 -0.161 -0.281 
a
   Controlling for PANAS scales, BMI, and binge eating severity 
b    Smaller AUC values indicate steeper discounting, thus a negative correlation indicates steeper discounting 
is associated with higher values of the correlated variable 
c
   Item taken from the PHQ 
*   p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
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 Also as an extension of the third aim, eating disorder psychopathology (as 
measured by the EDE-Q) was partially correlated with the averaged delay and averaged 
probability degree of discounting.  Similar to the results listed in Table 18, correlational 
analyses by group revealed that the significant relations between eating disorder 
psychopathology and the degree of discounting were carried by the BED and Obese 
groups, as the Control group showed no significant correlations.  Partial correlational 
analyses for the full sample are presented in Table 19.  The BED and Obese groups 
showed similar positive correlations, contrary to the expected negative correlations. 
      Table 19.  
      Partial Correlationsa of EDEQ Scales and Averaged (between Small and Large)  
      AUC Measures of Discountingb 
 Global Dietary 
Restraint 
Eating  
Concern 
Weight 
Concern 
Shape 
Concern 
Delay Discounting 
  Food 0.025 -0.065 0.022 0.061 0.072 
  Sedentary 
  Activity 
0.110 -0.108 0.022 0.206* 0.239* 
  Massage 0.054 -0.009 0.130 0.044 0.032 
  Money 0.257*  0.206* 0.320** 0.180 0.145 
Probability Discounting 
  Food -0.083 -0.147 -0.001 -0.023 -0.068 
  Sedentary  
  Activity 
 0.172  0.091  0.105  0.227*  0.135 
  Massage  0.026 -0.052  0.243* -0.010 -0.038 
  Money  0.246*  0.089  0.410**  0.198*  0.154 
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a
   Controlling for PANAS negative, BMI, binge eating severity, overall  
     psychopathology, and group 
b    Smaller AUC values indicate steeper discounting, thus a negative correlation indicates  
 steeper discounting is associated with higher values of the correlated variable 
*   p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
DISCUSSION 
This study compared discounting of delayed and probabilistic food, money, 
sedentary activity, and massage time among obese women with BED, obese women 
without BED, and normal-weight women.  The results demonstrated that women in the 
BED group discounted delayed and probabilistic rewards more steeply than women in 
the Obese and Control groups, with no differences seen between the latter two groups.  
Further, all three groups discounted delayed food to a greater extent than delayed 
money, and the BED group discounted delayed food significantly more steeply, relative 
to delayed money, as compared to the Obese and Control groups.  General 
psychopathology, but not eating disordered psychopathology, was significantly 
correlated with the degree of delay and probability discounting.  Obesity, binge eating, 
and questionnaire measures of impulsivity were not highly correlated with the degree of 
discounting.  These results indicate that women with BED choose rewards impulsively, 
especially in regard to food, and are more likely to be risk averse, than obese or normal-
weight women, and that obese and normal-weight women do not differ from each other 
in this discounting task thought to measure impulsive decision-making.    
Group and Reward Differences in Discounting. 
To examine possible differences in impulsive decision-making among obese 
women with BED, obese women without BED, and normal-weight women, differences in 
the degree of discounting of food, money, sedentary activity, and massage time were 
118 
 
compared across groups.  Group differences were indeed found, indicating possible 
differences in choice behavior among these participants outside the research setting, 
and providing external validity for discounting in a clinical group outside of substance 
abusers.  No previous study has examined the discounting of ‘abused’ rewards 
compared to other immediately reinforcing rewards in a clinical population such as 
individuals with eating disorders.  Consistent with the hypotheses of the study, with all 
rewards combined, women with BED differed significantly from obese and normal-weight 
women in both delay and probability discounting, indicating that women with BED tend to 
make more impulsive decisions (delay) and are more risk averse (probability) than 
women in the Obese and Control groups.  The finding that women with BED make more 
impulsive decisions overall as compared to women in the Obese and Control groups is 
consistent with previous research that has found that individuals with BED tend to be 
more impulsive on questionnaire measures than controls (e.g., Galanti, Gluck, & 
Geliebter, 2007; Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004).  This is the first study to find that 
individuals with BED make more impulsive decisions on a behavioral (non-
questionnaire) task and suggests that, while it may be challenging to focus on long-term 
benefits over short-term benefits, this process may be even more difficult for individuals 
with BED.  Thus, a logical next research step would involve comparing treatment options 
or differential treatment outcomes for those individuals with BED who score more 
impulsively on either questionnaire or behavioral measures. 
Making more impulsive decisions and being more risk averse – as seen in these 
women with BED – may seem counterintuitive.  However, harm avoidance (Cloninger, 
Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993) – a personality trait similar to risk aversion – is higher in 
individuals with eating disorders as compared to controls (e.g., Fassino et al., 2002; 
Klump et al., 2000), in individuals with BED as compared to obese individuals without 
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BED (Grucza, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 2007), and has been shown to predict eating 
beyond satiation (van den Bree & Cloninger, 2006).  Further, in individuals with an eating 
disorder, having a comorbid impulse-control disorder has been associated with higher 
harm avoidance (Fernandez-Aranda et al., 2008), consistent with this study’s findings.  
The BED group also may have presented as more risk averse because as a group they 
were more anxious (p < 0.001) than the Obese and Control groups, a characteristic 
shown to effect more cautious, risk-averse choices (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; 
Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999).  That a 
difference in the discounting of probabilistic rewards was found between the BED and 
the other groups is a departure, however, from an earlier study that found no difference 
in probabilistic discounting between individuals scoring high and low on impulsivity 
measures (Ostaszewski, 1997).  These findings on delay and probability discounting 
also provide further evidence against a unitary impulsivity construct underlying delay and 
probability discounting, where a significant negative relationship (from steep discounting 
of delayed rewards and shallow discounting of probabilistic rewards) would be expected 
if such a construct existed (Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003).  At the very 
least, risk-taking does not appear to go hand-in-hand with an inability to delay 
gratification, a conclusion supported by other research (Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003). 
The group differences indicating that women with BED respond in ways 
signifying risk aversiveness and impulsive decision-making align well with cogent 
evidence that negative mood precedes binge eating (Hilbert & Tuschen-Caffier, 2007; 
Spoor et al., 2007; Stein et al., 2007), stress increases the reinforcing value of food in 
binge eaters (Goldfield, Adamo, Rutherford, & Legg, 2008), and avoidance distraction 
and negative affect are associated with emotional eating (Spoor, Bekker, Van Strien, & 
Van Heck, 2007), particularly in highly impulsive individuals (Bekker, van de 
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Meerendonk, & Molerus, 2004).  Thus, it is not unreasonable to consider that individuals 
who make more impulsive decisions and/or are risk averse might be more likely to 
choose immediate rewards such as food to help avoid negative emotions.  These 
negative emotions are highly concordant with the BED diagnosis, where cluster analyses 
have revealed subgroups of high and low negative affect (Grilo, Masheb, & Wilson, 
2001; Loeb, Wilson, Gilbert, & Labouvie, 2000; Stice et al., 2001), and as many as 50% 
of individuals with BED suffer from a depressive disorder (Smith, Marcus, Lewis, 
Fitzgibbon, & Schreiner, 1998; Telch & Stice, 1998; Wilfley et al., 2000).  This evidence 
on negative emotions and risk aversiveness, in conjunction with recent research 
indicating significant relations among the neurological sensitivity to reward (Wang et al., 
2001), BMI (Davis & Fox, 2008; Davis, Patte et al., 2007; Franken & Muris, 2005), and 
binge eating (Davis, Levitan, Carter et al., 2007; Davis, Levitan, Kaplan et al., 2007) may 
indicate a possible etiological pathway by which obese women with BED may be more 
prone to respond to food – and possibly other immediate rewards – in an impulsive 
manner (Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 2007).  The interactions among impulsivity, 
negative affect, and sensitivity to reward in obese and binge-eating individuals deserve 
more attention in the literature than it has received previously (van den Bos & de Ridder, 
2006) and offers a rich future research direction. 
For delay discounting, BED participants differed significantly from obese and 
control participants in discounting food more steeply than money, possibly 
demonstrating that women with BED are more likely to find food more reinforcing than 
money as compared to the other women.  This finding is consistent with research that 
obese individuals work harder for access to food than the non-obese (Epstein & Leddy, 
2006; Saelens & Epstein, 1996), a finding supported by animal models (la Fleur et al., 
2007); however, the non-bingeing obese participants in this study did not discount 
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delayed food more steeply than money as compared to the normal-weight women.  In 
fact, the Obese group did not differ from the Control group in their discounting of any 
delayed or probabilistic rewards.  Therefore, this study suggests that obese individuals 
with BED may find food more reinforcing than money as compared to the Obese and 
Control groups, but more research is needed to determine whether obese individuals, 
with or without BED, find food more reinforcing than other individuals. 
BED participants also differed significantly from obese and control participants in 
discounting sedentary activity and massage time more steeply than money.  Sedentary 
activity has been shown to predict obesity (Hu, Li, Colditz, Willett, & Manson, 2003; 
Tucker & Bagwell, 1991), but the actual reinforcing value of sedentary activity in obese 
versus normal-weight individuals has received scant attention, with the research thus far 
restricted to the pediatric population.  Consistent with this study’s results, the pediatric 
research has found sedentary activity to have a greater relative reinforcing value for 
obese children than physical activity, and increasing in reinforcement as the level of 
obesity rises (Epstein, Smith, Vara, & Rodefer, 1991).  Children with overweight/obese 
parents also have been found to have a stronger preference for sedentary activities and 
to spend more time in sedentary pursuits than children with normal-weight parents 
(Wardle, Guthrie, Sanderson, Birch, & Plomin, 2001).  In this study, massage time 
functioned as a control variable, in that it was an immediately reinforcing reward, but not 
one that was hypothesized to be “abused” by an obese population.  Thus, there were no 
a priori predictions as to the degree to which individuals would discount this 
nonconsumable reward.  The finding with massage as the reward was consistent with 
the discounting of the immediately reinforcing rewards of food and sedentary activity in 
that BED participants discounted massage time more steeply than the generalized 
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conditioned reinforcer of money as compared to the obese and normal-weight 
participants. 
This study also examined discounting between different rewards.  For delayed 
rewards, it was expected that, similar to previous studies (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 
2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003), participants would discount food significantly more 
steeply than money.  This hypothesis was indeed supported.  Participants in all three 
groups discounted both sedentary activity and massage time more steeply than money.  
That is, in all three groups, as time to receipt increased, a greater percentage of the 
value of food, sedentary activity, and massage time was lost than the percentage of the 
value of money.  Previous research has been unclear as to whether all directly 
consumable rewards are discounted equivalently, albeit more steeply than money, or 
whether a directly consumable reward abused by an individual has a special status, 
beyond its enhanced present value (Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; Petry, 
2001a).  Since delayed money was discounted less steeply than the three other directly 
consumable rewards, it appears to be the timing of the reward that is the important 
variable, and not the content of the reward.  These findings support earlier research that 
discounting differences reflect a general property of consumable rewards rather than 
“abused” rewards holding special value for their “abuser” (Odum & Rainaud, 2003).  
Delayed money may be discounted less steeply than immediately consumable rewards 
because money retains its value and is exchangeable for other goods, whereas 
immediately consumable rewards such as alcohol or food are most valuable at the 
moment of discounting (Catania, 1998; Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006).  However, 
it is to be recalled that the BED participants did significantly differ as hypothesized from 
obese and control participants in discounting food more steeply than money, suggesting 
that an “abused” reward does matter for its “abuser.”  For probability discounting, it has 
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been reported that type of reward has no differential effect on discounting in non-obese 
participants (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007); it was unclear, however, whether a 
differential effect of reward type would be found in an obese or eating disordered 
population.  Consistent with Estle et al. (2007), the BED and Obese groups performed 
similarly to non-obese participants; no differences between discounting of probabilistic 
rewards were found.  
Group differences on the questionnaire measures of impulsivity (UPPS, BIS-11) 
were evaluated to determine whether differences seen in the discounting task also would 
be apparent on self-report measures.  Exploratory analyses revealed that the BED group 
endorsed significantly higher Urgency (from the UPPS) – defined as the tendency, 
specifically in the face of negative affect, to act quickly and without planning (Whiteside 
& Lynam, 2001) – than the Obese or Control groups.  Urgency was not correlated 
significantly with measures of delay discounting, although it was correlated positively 
with the discounting of probabilistic food, sedentary activity, and money (i.e., more risk-
taking = higher urgency), and other studies have found urgency to be predictive of 
(Anestis, Selby, & Joiner, 2007), or associated with (Claes, Vandereycken, & 
Vertommen, 2005; Fischer & Smith, 2008), binge eating behavior.  The key component 
of the Urgency definition may be “in the face of negative affect.”  Negative affect, in 
combination with higher harm avoidance and the expectation that food can alleviate 
negative affect, may contribute to the higher urgency and consequent binge eating seen 
in individuals with BED (Fischer & Smith, 2008; Stein et al., 2007).  However, no other 
group differences in the impulsivity questionnaires subscales were found, once again 
highlighting the various definitions and multidimensionality aspect of impulsivity. 
  Currently, BED is a provisional diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), 4th edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
as a disorder in need of further study.  Extensive research, in the past decade 
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especially, has supported BED as a clinically significant disorder distinct from obesity 
without BED (e.g., Grucza, Przybeck, & Cloninger, 2007; Pope et al., 2006; Wilfley, 
Wilson, & Agras, 2003) that warrants inclusion in the upcoming DSM-V as a separate 
diagnosis (Hudson, Hiripi, Pope, & Kessler, 2007; Wilfley, Bishop, Wilson, & Agras, 
2007).  This study adds to this already abundant literature by demonstrating that a 
community sample of women with BED was significantly more likely to make impulsive 
decisions about rewards in an experimental task than obese or normal-weight women.  
Other research suggests that BED status moderates weight loss among individuals in 
weight treatment programs (Blaine & Rodman, 2007; Pagoto et al., 2007), and cognitive 
behavior therapy augments the effects of group weight loss treatment (Devlin, Goldfein, 
Petkova, Liu, & Walsh, 2007).  Thus, if as this study suggests, individuals with BED tend 
to make more impulsive decisions than obese individuals without BED, then more 
intense psychological treatment focused on cognitive processes or emotional regulation 
(e.g., cognitive behavior therapy or dialectical behavior therapy; Telch, Agras, & 
Linehan, 2001; Wilson, 1999) may be more effective for individuals with BED than, for 
example, weight loss treatment focused on modifying behaviors.  Whether a more 
intensive treatment is necessary for impulsive individuals with BED would be a question 
well-suited to a stepped-care treatment study.  For example, cognitive behavior therapy 
could be added to a basic behavioral treatment such as bibliotherapy for individuals not 
responding to treatment (Masheb & Grilo, 2007; Wilson, Vitousek, & Loeb, 2000).   
It also would be worthwhile for future research to examine the predictive power of 
discounting, in terms of treatment outcome, for individuals with BED, as the predictive 
value of discounting in treatment has thus far only been examined in research with 
nicotine (e.g., Krishnan-Sarin et al., 2007; Yoon et al., 2007), and to see whether 
extreme rates of discounting are amenable with more intensive treatments.  These 
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answers also would aid in the development and implementation of prevention and 
treatment programs for other impulse-control disorders, such as substance use 
disorders. 
Relations among Obesity, Binge Eating, and Discounting 
It was hypothesized that levels of obesity and binge eating would be significantly 
correlated with the degree to which delayed but not probabilistic rewards are discounted.  
Support for this hypothesis included addiction literature that has found significant 
correlations between number of cigarettes smoked (Ohmura, Takahashi, & Kitamura, 
2005; Reynolds, 2004), and alcohol addiction severity (Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & 
Boettiger, 2005), and rate of discounting of delayed but not probabilistic rewards.  In 
addition, binge severity (Nasser, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2004) and test-meal intake (Galanti, 
Gluck, & Geliebter, 2007) have been found to be significantly correlated with impulsivity 
as measured by the BIS-11.  In this study, however, obesity and binge eating were not 
correlated with the degree of discounting either delayed or probabilistic rewards, 
supporting only our hypotheses of no effect regarding probabilistic rewards.  
 Levels of obesity (as measured by BMI) were not significantly correlated with the 
discounting of delayed or probabilistic rewards, although obesity and the discounting of 
delayed food were correlated at a trend level, offering some support to the external 
validity of food in the discounting task.  It does not appear that obesity in and of itself is 
associated with the discounting of rewards, not surprising since the Obese group in this 
study did not differ from the Control group on discounting delayed or probabilistic 
rewards. 
 Severity of binge eating (as measured by the average number of weekly binges 
during the past six months) was not significantly correlated with the discounting of 
delayed or probabilistic rewards.  However, 70% of the BED group had an average of 2-
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3 binges weekly, so it may be that there was not enough variability to detect an effect.  
Future research should examine the association between severity of binge eating and 
discounting tasks in a larger sample. 
Relations between Discounting and Psychopathology 
As predicted, the degree of discounting of the delayed rewards of food, 
sedentary activity, and massage time were significantly correlated with the BSI 
measures of overall psychopathology, anxiety, depression, psychoticism (in this non-
psychotic sample, measuring social alienation; Derogatis & Melisaratos, 1983), 
somatization (except for massage time), and hostility.  A preliminary alcohol abuse 
diagnosis was not correlated with degree of delay discounting.  Considering the history 
of significant associations between substance abuse and degree of discounting  (e.g., 
Reynolds, 2006b), this finding likely was due to insufficient power given that only 7% of 
this study’s sample endorsed a preliminary diagnosis of alcohol abuse.  Money, while 
not immediately reinforcing, also was significantly correlated with all aspects of 
psychopathology except alcohol abuse.  These results indicate that more impulsive 
decision-making is associated with higher psychopathology.  
The probabilistic rewards of food, sedentary activity, and massage time were 
significantly correlated with global psychopathology.  Psychoticism was not associated 
with the discounting of any of the probabilistic rewards.  All other categories of 
psychopathology (anxiety, depression, hostility, and somatization) were correlated with 
at least one of the probabilistic rewards, except for a preliminary alcohol abuse 
diagnosis, which was correlated with the probabilistic rewards of sedentary activity and 
massage time.  These results indicate that greater psychopathology was associated with 
less risk-taking, except for alcohol abuse, in which greater psychopathology was 
associated with more risk-taking. 
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 However, exploratory analyses revealed that the high number of significant 
correlations likely was due to the significant relations seen between the BED group’s 
degree of discounting (particularly on delay discounting) and levels of psychopathology, 
as measured by the BSI.  The Control group’s levels of psychopathology were not 
correlated with any discounting measures whereas the Obesity group’s levels of 
depression and psychoticism were significantly correlated with the delayed reward of 
food.  The external validity of food in the discounting task is again supported by this 
finding that depression and psychoticism (again, akin to measuring social alienation in a 
non-psychotic population) were correlated with impulsive decision-making around food, 
as both of these traits have been linked previously to excessive food consumption (e.g., 
Lauder, Mummery, Jones, & Caperchione, 2006; Stein et al., 2007; Stunkard, Faith, & 
Allison, 2003).  It appears from these analyses that general psychopathology is indeed 
related to impulsive decision-making, a conclusion that is not  surprising given the role 
impulsivity plays as a criterion for a variety of clinical disorders, ranging from substance 
abuse to borderline personality disorder (Dawe & Loxton, 2004; Evenden, 1999).  
However, this appears to be an area ripe for further research, especially as it pertains to 
the possibility that discounting could discriminate between other clinical disorders, or 
show particularly strong relations with impulse-control disorders such as kleptomania. 
 Despite these strong associations between psychopathology and discounting, 
especially in the BED group, other exploratory analyses did not find correlations in the 
expected negative direction between the degree of delay discounting and eating 
disordered psychopathology.  Rather, the results with the delayed rewards suggest a 
relation between more impulsive decision-making and less eating disordered 
psychopathology, with significant results from the probabilistic rewards suggesting a 
relationship between more risk-taking and more eating disordered psychopathology, 
both of which run contrary to previous literature regarding impulsivity and eating 
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disorders (e.g., Claes, Vandereycken, & Vertommen, 2005), as well as the results from 
the primary aim of this study.  It would be worthwhile to administer discounting tasks to 
individuals with other eating disorders such as bulimia nervosa or anorexia nervosa to 
ascertain whether these results can be replicated. 
Relations among Impulsivity Measures 
The impulsivity questionnaires UPPS and BIS-11 were more significantly related 
to each other (8 of 16 correlations significant) than either one of the questionnaires were 
related to the discounting tasks.  Indeed, the UPPS was not significantly related to the 
discounting of any of the delayed rewards, whereas the BIS-11 was not significantly 
related to the discounting of any of the probabilistic rewards.  It does appear, however, 
that the Urgency scale of the UPPS (defined as the tendency, specifically in the face of 
negative affect, to act quickly and without planning) is associated with risk-taking since it 
was positively associated with the discounting of probabilistic food, sedentary activity, 
and money.  This may be a particularly salient subscale for future studies on impulsivity 
and binge eating to focus on, since the BED group also endorsed higher Urgency in this 
study than did the Obese and Control group.  This is the first study to examine the UPPS 
in relation to other impulsivity measures, and the results provide evidence of significant 
relations with another self-report measure, but not with a delay discounting task. 
 Earlier studies have been equivocal in whether self-report measures of 
impulsivity are correlated with behavioral measures of impulsivity, including discounting 
(Bjork, Hommer, Grant, & Danube, 2004; Heyman & Gibb, 2006; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 
1999; Mitchell, Fields, D'Esposito, & Boettiger, 2005; Mobini, Grant, Kass, & Yeomans, 
2007; Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 1999; Swann, Bjork, Moeller, & Dougherty, 
2002), or whether these relationships are weak at best (Crean, Richards, & de Wit, 
2002; Dom, De Wilde, Hulstijn, Van Den Brink, & Sabbe, 2006; Reynolds, Ortengren, 
Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  Further, self-report questionnaires of impulsivity appear to be 
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more intercorrelated (e.g., Lane, Cherek, Rhoades, Pietras, & Tcheremissine, 2003; 
Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006) than the intercorrelations of laboratory-
task measures of impulsivity behavior such as discounting (e.g., de Wit, Enggasser, & 
Richards, 2002; Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006; Reynolds, Richards, & 
de Wit, 2006).  This study provides further evidence that self-report measures and 
behavioral measures assess different forms of impulsivity.  
Within behavioral measures of impulsivity, one study aimed to further define 
impulsivity by performing a principal component analysis for four commonly used 
behavioral measures (Reynolds, Ortengren, Richards, & de Wit, 2006).  Reynolds and 
colleagues found that two components were formed, one component whose loadings 
were significant was described as “impulsive decision-making,” and included the delay 
discounting task and the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (a computerized, behavioral 
measure of risk-taking; Lejuez et al., 2002), whereas the other component was 
described as “impulsive disinhibition.”  Additional support comes from a discounting 
study (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007) where a factor analysis revealed that delay 
and probability discounting loaded on separate factors:  the discounting measures of all 
four probabilistic rewards (money, beer, soda, and candy) had loadings greater than .75 
on one factor and less than .35 on the other factor, whereas the reverse was true for the 
measures of the delayed rewards (Green & Myerson, in press).  Other studies have 
performed similar principal component analyses to assess self-report measures of 
impulsivity (e.g., Petry, 2001c), or to form a new measure of impulsivity (UPPS; 
Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), but a study is greatly needed that will perform these or other 
sophisticated analyses on the full gamut of impulsivity measures – behavioral and 
questionnaire – in order to better elucidate the components of impulsivity and relations 
among these components.  
 
130 
 
Magnitude Effect 
 The magnitude effect for delayed rewards, namely that larger delayed amounts 
of rewards are discounted less steeply than smaller delayed amounts, was evaluated 
within the full sample, and by group, with similar results.  In the full sample, the 
magnitude effect was seen for the delayed reward of money, consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Baker, Johnson, & Bickel, 2003; Green, Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; 
Johnson & Bickel, 2002).  However, inconsistent with previous research that has found 
the magnitude effect for other non-monetary delayed rewards (e.g., Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Schoenfelder & Hantula, 2003), the magnitude effect was not 
demonstrated for delayed food, sedentary activity, or massage.  Further, the significant 
effect of amount was in the opposite direction for delayed sedentary activity and 
massage.  Given the general consensus of the effect of amount on the delay discounting 
of money, demonstrating a magnitude effect with delayed money is not surprising.  The 
effect of amount on the discounting of delayed rewards of food, sedentary activity, and 
massage are inconsistent with previous research, although research has found the 
magnitude effect to be smaller with consumable rewards than with monetary rewards 
(Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007).  The research on the effect of amount on non-
monetary delayed rewards is too scant and requires further replication before firm 
conclusions can be made.   
Consistent with previous research that had found an opposite magnitude effect 
with probabilistic rewards (e.g., Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Myerson, Green, Hanson, 
Holt, & Estle, 2003), that is, smaller probabilistic rewards are discounted less steeply 
than larger probabilistic rewards, the small probabilistic rewards of food, sedentary 
activity, massage, and money were discounted less steeply than the large amount.  
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Strengths and Limitations 
 Strengths of the current study include the large and ethnically representative (St. 
Louis region’s Caucasian population is 75%, compared to the 78% proportion in this 
sample), and wide age range (18-65) of participants recruited from the community.  
Although the sample was highly educated (Mean years = 15.5), income levels were 
more diverse; thus, the results can be generalized safely to most adult women.  Other 
strengths include the novel application of the discounting task to obese women with 
BED.  
 Limitations include the use of obese participants who were recruited in part by 
offering group behavioral weight loss treatment.  Only a minority of the obese 
participants attended the behavioral weight loss sessions, but this population of obese 
women may perform differently on discounting tasks than obese women in the 
community who are not interested in losing weight.  Thus, our findings are more safely 
generalizable to obese, treatment-seeking women.  Additionally, it would be helpful for 
future research to validate the utility of food and sedentary activity in the context of a 
discounting task, for example, by offering the rewards chosen at the end of the task.  
Nevertheless, this study provided some evidence of their external validity in the context 
of a discounting task by finding group differences in the primary aim in the hypothesized 
direction, and a small correlation between obesity and the discounting of food.  
Summary and Future Directions 
Despite the fact that the DSM-IV criteria for BED includes impulsive 
characteristics such as lack of control over eating, research examining the relations 
between impulsivity and BED has not been widely conducted.  Research that has been 
conducted has suggested that individuals with BED are more impulsive than obese or 
normal-weight individuals without BED (Galanti, Gluck, & Geliebter, 2007).  This is the 
first study, however, to demonstrate a difference in impulsive decision-making for 
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women with BED on a behavioral task (rather than questionnaire), and with rewards that 
might be considered “abused” in this population – food and sedentary activity.  Further, 
both delay and probability discounting appear to be highly correlated with at least one 
self-report measure of general psychopathology (BSI), indicating a need to assess 
individuals with other psychiatric disorders, especially impulse-control disorders. 
Conversely, the weak correlations between discounting and eating-disordered 
psychopathology, obesity, and severity of binge eating portend a need for further study. 
This study also replicated earlier research on the multidimensionality of impulsivity, 
noting little correlation between discounting and the self-report measures of impulsivity, 
and only moderate correlations between the two self-report measures of impulsivity. 
Research into impulsivity and its manifestations clearly would benefit from further 
delineation of the construct.  Finally, this study replicated earlier research on the effect of 
amount on delayed money and probabilistic rewards, but did not find an effect of amount 
on degree of discounting delayed food, and found an effect of amount on the discounting 
of sedentary activity and massage time inconsistent with previous literature for non-
monetary rewards, thus requiring replication (Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; 
Schoenfelder & Hantula, 2003). 
Group differences were obtained in the decisions involving smaller and larger 
amounts of the same reward, such as a small amount of food now and a larger amount 
of food later, but a decision between food or sedentary activity now and a more abstract 
reward in the future (e.g., good health, lower weight) is perhaps a more appropriate 
conceptualization of the choices individuals make in Western society (van den Bos & de 
Ridder, 2006).  Thus, future studies should compare the immediately gratifying variables 
with more abstract delayed variables that may be more ecologically valid.  Also, 
consistent with other research that has found women with BED to endorse more 
psychopathology than obese women without BED, this BED group endorsed more 
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psychopathology than the Obese or Control groups.  Thus, if future studies continue to 
study discounting within an eating-disordered population, it will be important to include a 
psychiatric control group.  Future studies also need to study other psychiatric disorders 
within a discounting task as well, given its strong relationship with a self-report measure 
of psychopathology. 
 Clinical implications from this study will depend on future research.  The findings 
in this study that women in the BED group made more impulsive decisions than women 
in the Obese and Control groups provides a window into possible reasons whereby 
specialty treatments are more effective in treating BED than more basic behavioral 
weight loss therapies that target food intake and physical activity.  Currently, cognitive 
behavior therapy is the most well-established treatment for BED (Wilson, 2005), with 
interpersonal psychotherapy performing similarly to cognitive behavior therapy (Wilfley et 
al., 2002), and dialectical behavior therapy (Kristeller, Quillian-Wolever, & Sheets, 2004) 
showing promise (Telch, Agras, & Linehan, 2001).  Cognitive behavior therapy works to 
modify maladaptive thoughts, interpersonal psychotherapy targets maladaptive 
interpersonal functioning, and dialectical behavior therapy targets dysregulated emotions 
and behavior.  In this study, examining how individuals with BED responded to choices 
regarding food and other rewards, one can imagine how more basic behavioral weight 
loss therapy that advocates fewer high-caloric choices would be difficult for this group, 
and may not be as helpful as specialty treatments that target the factors that work to 
maintain the binge eating.  Further, the high negative affect cluster seen within BED may 
present extra challenges for treatment (Masheb & Grilo, 2008).  Dialectical behavior 
therapy, or other novel therapies that target impulsive behavior, may be useful for the 
subgroup of BED individuals with negative affect or impulsivity, and future research may 
determine that targeting impulsive behavior could impact not just the eating disorder, but 
other areas such as employment and relationships.   
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  In addition, future studies to determine whether discounting tasks predict 
treatment outcomes for individuals with BED or other psychiatric disorders would be 
helpful in furthering the use of experimental tasks within clinical psychology.  Finally, in 
order to further deconstruct the applications of discounting, it would be ideal to 
determine the relations among discounting and various clinical populations, rewards, 
and emotional states.  The intersection of experimental and clinical science is just one 
avenue that needs to be explored comprehensively in order to provide novel insight into, 
and treatment for, obesity and binge eating. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A. Glossary 
 
Introduction 
Delay discounting: decrease in the subjective value of a reward as the time until its 
receipt increases. 
Probability discounting: decrease in the subjective value of a reward as the odds against 
its receipt increases (probability decreases). 
Impulsivity (behavioral definition): choice of a smaller, more immediate reward over a 
larger, more delayed reward. 
Self-control (behavioral definition): choice of a larger, more delayed reward over a 
smaller, more immediate reward. 
Discounting 
Magnitude effect:  Larger amounts of delayed rewards are discounted less steeply than 
smaller delayed amounts. 
Preference reversals:  Individuals often choose the smaller, more immediate reward over 
a larger, delayed reward, but this preference reverses when delays to both 
rewards are increased equally. 
Delay effect:  Discount rates tend to be higher for short delays than for longer delays. 
Sign effect:  Amounts framed as a gain in a discounting task are discounted at a higher 
rate than are equal amounts framed as a loss. 
Domain independence: Individuals produce reliable discount rates within a domain, but 
demonstrate low discounting rate correlations between domains, such as that 
between health and money. 
Discount utility theory (from economic theory): The same delay discount rate should be 
applied to all outcomes if goods are indeed exchangeable. 
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Impulsivity and Binge Eating 
Binge Eating: eating an unambiguously large amount of food accompanied by a sense of 
loss of control. 
Binge Eating Disorder (BED): recurrent episodes of binge eating (average of at least 
twice a week for six months) in the absence of regular use of inappropriate 
compensatory behaviors (e.g., vomiting, laxative use). 
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Appendix B. Verbal Instructions to Participants for Discounting Tasks 
Adapted from Myerson, Green, Hanson, Holt, & Estle, 2003 
The delay discounting instructions were as follows: ‘‘You will be asked to make a group 
of choices between hypothetical monetary alternatives. These choices will be displayed 
on the screen. On some trials, one amount of money is to be paid right now, and this 
amount will vary from trial to trial. The other amount of money will remain fixed, but its 
payment will be delayed. The screen will show you how long the delay will be. For each 
choice, if you would prefer to have the amount that is shown on the left, you will use the 
mouse to click on the left box. If you would prefer to have the amount that is shown on 
the right, you will use the mouse to click on the right box. If at any time you change your 
mind about a choice, you can return to the start of that group of choices by pressing the 
reset button at the bottom of the screen. There are no correct or incorrect choices. We 
are interested in the option you would prefer.’’ 
 
The probability discounting instructions were as follows: ‘‘You will be asked to make a 
group of choices between hypothetical monetary alternatives. These choices will be 
displayed on the screen. On some trials, one amount of money is to be paid for sure, 
and this amount will vary from trial to trial. The other amount of money will remain fixed, 
but its payment will be probabilistic. The screen will show you what the probability will 
be. As before, for each choice, if you would prefer to have the amount that is shown on 
the left, you will use the mouse to click on the left box. If you would prefer to have the 
amount that is shown on the right, you will use the mouse to click on the right box. If at 
any time you change your mind about a choice, you can return to the start of that group 
of choices by pressing the reset button at the bottom of the screen. Remember, there 
are no correct or incorrect choices. We are interested in the option you would prefer.’’ 
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Appendix C. Examples of Amounts of Food Reward 
 
Each amount given is equivalent to one unit 
 
Category 
 
1. Candy: non-chocolate: 1 bag (vending machine sized) 
 
2. Candy bar: 1 candy bar 
 
3. Chips: 1 bag (vending machine sized) 
 
4. Cookies: 1 package (vending machine sized) 
 
5. Popcorn: 1 single-serving bag  
 
6. Crackers/hard pretzels: 1 bag (vending machine sized) 
 
7. Nuts/seeds: 1 bag (vending machine sized) 
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Appendix D. VAS Hunger Rating 
 
 
1.             How hungry do you feel? 
 
  I am not                                                                                                                       I am             
hungry at all                                                                                  famished 
     
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
 
2.            How satisfied do you feel? 
 
         I am                                                  I cannot eat                                                           
completely empty              another bite 
                         
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
         
3.                How full do you feel? 
 
Not at all full                                                                                                      Totally full 
                                
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
      
4.              How much do you think 
          you can eat? 
 
Nothing at all                                                                                                                        A lot 
                   
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
 
5.               Would you like to eat 
     something sweet? 
                              
No, not at all                                                                                                              Yes, very much 
 
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
 
6.               Would you like to eat 
                 something salty? 
                            
No, not at all         Yes, very much 
 
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
 
 
7.              Would you like to eat 
          something savory/flavorful? 
                           
 No, not at all         Yes, very much 
 
     0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
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8.                        Would you like to eat 
              something fatty? 
                           
 No, not at all         Yes, very much 
 
    0                 1                     2                     3                       4                     5                      6 
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Appendix E. Snack Preference Measure 
      
Imagine that you are at a vending machine. Assuming this machine has your favorite 
brand or item in each category, which of the 7 categories listed below would you most 
prefer?  Please indicate your most-preferred category by listing its name and number 
below. 
 
 
Category 
 
1. Candy: non-chocolate (e.g., Skittles™, jelly beans, Sweet Tarts™) 
 
2. Candy bar: chocolate (e.g., Snickers™, M&M’s™, Hershey’s bar™, 3 Musketeers™) 
 
3. Chips (e.g., potato, corn, tortilla, Cheetos™, Funyuns™) 
 
4. Cookies (e.g., Oreos™, Chips Ahoy!™, Nutter Butter™) 
 
5. Popcorn (e.g., butter, kettle korn) 
 
6. Crackers/hard pretzels (e.g., Ritz™, Wheat Thins™, graham crackers) 
 
7. Nuts/seeds (e.g., peanuts, cashews, sunflower seeds) 
 
 
 
Of the 7 categories of snack items listed above, which would you most prefer:    
 
 
__________________________ 
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Appendix F. Leisure Activities Questionnaire 
 
Which of the following leisure activities do you most prefer? Please choose only one, 
and write the number/category here:  
 
______________________________________ 
         
 
1. Watching TV/videos   
2. Playing video/computer games        
3. Reading (e.g., magazines, books, newspapers) 
4. Driving                                                      
5. Surfing the Internet  
6. Sleeping/napping  
7. Playing solitary games (e.g., crossword puzzles, Sudoku, Solitaire)   
8. Playing board games/card games     
9. Going to movie/play/show  
10. Talking on the phone 
11. Writing/journaling 
12. Other (List _______________________)          
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   1. Food will be more skewed than money (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.288675 
 
0.288675 
 
0 0 0 0 -0.288675 
 
-0.288675 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Control 0.288675 
 
0.288675 
 
0 0 0 0 -0.288675 
 
-0.288675 
 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Obese 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 -0.288675 -0.288675 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   
  2. Food will be more skewed than money (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 -0.288675 -0.288675 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 -0.288675 -0.288675 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 -0.288675 -0.288675 
 
Appendix G. Contrasts codes for 33 discounting hypotheses 
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3.  Food will be more skewed than money (delay vs. probability) 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg 
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 -
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
0 0 0 0 0.20412
4 
0.20412
4 
Control 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 -
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
0 0 0 0 0.20412
4 
0.20412
4 
Obese 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 -
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
-
0.20412
4 
0 0 0 0 0.20412
4 
0.20412
4 
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  4. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure (delay) 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm 
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.3333
33 
0.3333
33 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0.3333
33 
0.3333
33 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0.3333
33 
0.3333
33 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  
 5. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure (probability) 
 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333333 0.333333 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333333 0.333333 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.333333 0.333333 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 -0.166667 0 0 
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  6. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure (delay vs. probability) 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm 
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.23570
2 
0.23570
2 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
0 0 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0.11785
1 
0.11785
1 
0.117851 0.117851 0 0 
Control 0.23570
2 
0.23570
2 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
0 0 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0.11785
1 
0.11785
1 
0.117851 0.117851 0 0 
Obese 0.23570
2 
0.23570
2 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
-
0.117851 
0 0 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0.11785
1 
0.11785
1 
0.117851 0.117851 0 0 
 
  7. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money (delay) 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.333333 
-
0.333333 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.333333 
-
0.333333 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.333333 
-
0.333333 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  8. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money (probability) 
Food 
sm 
delay 
Food 
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg 
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm 
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -0.333333 -0.333333 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -0.333333 -0.333333 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -0.333333 -0.333333 
 
 
  9. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money (delay vs. probability) 
 Food 
sm 
delay 
Food 
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0 0 -
0.117851 
-0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 
 
Control 0 0 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0 0 -
0.117851 
-0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 
 
Obese 0 0 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 -
0.235702 
-
0.235702 
0 0 -
0.117851 
-0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 
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 10. BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.144338 -0.144338 -0.144338 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese -0.144338 -0.144338 -0.144338 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 11. BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (probability) 
 Food 
sm 
delay 
Food 
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg 
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 0.288675 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-0.144338 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-0.144338 
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12. BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay vs. probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 0.20412 -
0.20412 
-
0.20412 
-
0.20412 
-0.20412 -0.20412 -0.20412 -0.20412 -0.20412 
 
Control -
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-0.10206 -0.10206 -
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 
 
Obese -
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
-0.10206 -0.10206 -
0.10206 
-
0.10206 
0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 0.10206 
 
 
13. Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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14. Obese will be more skewed than Controls (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food 
 lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
 
 
15. Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay vs. probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -
0.1767
8 
-
0.1767
8 
-
0.17678 
-
0.17678 
-0.17678 -0.17678 -
0.1767
8 
-
0.1767
8 
0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 
Obese 0.1767
8 
0.1767
8 
0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.17678 0.1767
8 
0.1767
8 
-
0.17678 
-0.17678 -0.17678 -0.17678 -0.17678 -0.17678 -0.17678 -0.17678 
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 16. Food will be more skewed than money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.408248 0.408248 0 0 0 0 -0.408248 -0.408248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.204124 -0.204124 0 0 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese -0.204124 -0.204124 0 0 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
  17. Food will be more skewed than money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food 
 lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.408248 0.408248 0 0 0 0 -0.408248 -0.408248 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.204124 -0.204124 0 0 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.204124 -0.204124 0 0 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 
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 18. Food will be more skewed than money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay vs. probability) 
Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm 
delay 
Leisure  
lg 
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm 
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0 0 -
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
0 0 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 
 
 
Control -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0 0 0 0 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0 0 0 0 -0.144338 -0.144338 
 
Obese -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0 0 0 0 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0 0 0 0 -0.144338 -0.144338 
 
 
 19. Food will be more skewed than money; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food 
 lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.353553 -0.353553 0 0 0 0 0.353553 0.353553 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0.353553 0.353553 0 0 0 0 -0.353553 -0.353553 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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20. Food will be more skewed than money; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
-0.353553 -0.353553 0 0 0 0 0.353553 0.353553 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0.353553 0.353553 0 0 0 0 -0.353553 -0.353553 
 
21. Food will be more skewed than money; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay vs. probability) 
 Food 
 sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.25 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25 
 
Obese 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 
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22. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure, BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food 
 lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
 lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.471405 0.471405 -0.235702 -0.235702 -0.235702 -0.235702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -0.235702 -0.235702 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese -0.235702 -0.235702 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
23. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure, BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.471405 0.471405 -
0.235702 
-0.235702 -0.235702 -
0.235702 
0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.235702 -0.235702 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.235702 -0.235702 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0.117851 0 0 
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24. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure, BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay vs. probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm 
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food 
 lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0.333333 0.333333 -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0 0 -
0.333333 
-
0.333333 
0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0 0 
Control -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0.166667 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
0 0 
Obese -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
0 0 
 
25. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control -
0.408248 
-
0.408248 
0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0.408248 0.408248 -
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  26. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
0.408248 
-0.408248 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.408248 0.408248 -0.204124 -
0.204124 
-0.204124 -
0.204124 
0 0 
 
 
  27. Food will be more skewed than Massage and Leisure; Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay vs. probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm 
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Control -
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0 0 0.288675 0.288675 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-0.144338 0 0 
Obese 0.288675 0.288675 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0 0 -
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
0.144337
567 
0.144337
567 
0.144337
567 
0.1443375
67 
0 0 
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  28. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure 
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0.235702 0.235702 0.235702 0.235702 -0.471405 -0.471405 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 -
0.117851 
-0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 -
0.117851 
-0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
  29. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
 lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 0.235702 0.235702 0.235702 0.235702 -0.471405 -0.471405 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 -0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
0 0 -0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 -0.117851 0.235702 0.235702 
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  30. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money; BED will be more skewed than Controls and Obese (delay vs. probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 0.166667 -
0.333333 
-
0.333333 
0 0 -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
0.333333 0.333333 
 
Control 0 0 -
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
0.166667 0.166667 0 0 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
Obese 0 0 -
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
-
0.083333 
0.166667 0.166667 0 0 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 0.083333 -
0.166667 
-
0.166667 
 
  31. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money, Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food  
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food 
 sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 -
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
-
0.204124 
0.408248 0.408248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Obese 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 -
0.408248 
-
0.408248 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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  32. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money, Obese will be more skewed than Controls (probability) 
 Food  
sm 
delay 
Food 
 lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money  
lg  
delay 
Food  
sm 
prob 
Food  
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Control 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0.204124 -0.204124 -0.204124 -0.204124 0.408248 0.408248 
 
Obese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 0.204124 -0.408248 -0.408248 
 
      
       33. Massage and Leisure will be more skewed than Money, Obese will be more skewed than Controls (delay vs. probability) 
 Food 
sm 
delay 
Food 
lg 
delay 
Leisure 
sm  
delay 
Leisure  
lg  
delay 
Massage  
sm  
delay 
Massage  
lg  
delay 
Money  
sm  
delay 
Money 
lg  
delay 
Food 
sm 
prob 
Food 
lg 
prob 
Leisure  
sm  
prob 
Leisure  
lg 
prob 
Massage 
sm 
prob 
Massage 
lg 
prob 
Money 
sm 
prob 
Money 
lg  
prob 
BED 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Control 0 0 -
0.144338 
-
0.14433
8 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0.288675 0.288675 0 0 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 0.144338 -
0.288675 
-0.288675 
Obese 0 0 0.144338 0.14433
8 
0.144338 0.144338 -
0.288675 
-
0.288675 
0 0 -
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
-
0.144338 
0.288675 0.288675 
 
